Why Resilience May Not Always Be a Good Thing: Lessons in Ecosystem Restoration from Glen Canyon and the Everglades by Zellmer, Sandi & Gunderson, Lance
Nebraska Law Review 
Volume 87 Issue 4 Article 2 
2008 
Why Resilience May Not Always Be a Good Thing: Lessons in 
Ecosystem Restoration from Glen Canyon and the Everglades 
Sandi Zellmer 
University of Nebraska Lincoln, szellmer2@unl.edu 
Lance Gunderson 
University of Nebraska-Lincoln, lgunderson2@unl.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/nlr 
Recommended Citation 
Sandi Zellmer and Lance Gunderson, Why Resilience May Not Always Be a Good Thing: Lessons in 
Ecosystem Restoration from Glen Canyon and the Everglades, 87 Neb. L. Rev. (2008) 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/nlr/vol87/iss4/2 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law, College of at DigitalCommons@University of 
Nebraska - Lincoln. It has been accepted for inclusion in Nebraska Law Review by an authorized administrator of 
DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln. 
Sandra Zellmer* and Lance Gunderson**
Why Resilience May Not Always Be a
Good Thing: Lessons in Ecosystem
Restoration from Glen Canyon and
the Everglades
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. Introduction .......................................... 894
II. Resilience Theory, Sustainability and Ecosystem
Restoration ................................. ......... 896
A. Resilience, Adaptive Management, and Sustainable
Developm ent ...................................... 897
B. National Legislative Goals ......................... 900
1. Multiple Use, Maximum Sustained Yield
M andates ..................................... 901
a. Fish, Forests, and Rangelands .............. 901
b. Water Resources Development, Flood
Control, and Floodplain Management ....... 905
2. Integrity of Water Resources ................... 906
3. Biological Conservation and Park Lands ....... 909
4. Adaptive Management ......................... 910
III. Case Studies: The Everglades and the Grand Canyon
Restoration Projects ................................... 912
A. The Everglades: Physical Condition and Legislative
Fram ework ....................................... 913
1. The C&SFP Canals and the Federal Restoration
Plan s .......................................... 915
2. Florida State Water Law ...................... 922
B. The Grand Canyon: Physical Condition and
Legislative Framework ............................ 923
© Copyright held by the NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW.
* Alumni Professor of Natural Resources Law and McCollum Research Chair, Uni-
versity of Nebraska College of Law. Thanks go to the NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW and
the Center for Progressive Reform for cosponsoring this Symposium, and espe-
cially to Articles Editor Michelle Sitorius for her dedication to seeing this project
through.
** Associate Professor of Environmental Studies, Emory University.
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
IV. Lessons Learned ...................................... 928
A. Consensus-Based Management Can Obstruct
Restoration Progress .............................. 929
1. Adaptive Management on the Grand Canyon ... 930
2. Everglades-Caught in a Quagmire and Unable
to M ove ....................................... 934
3. Observations: Avoid Spurious Certitude ........ 942
B. Delegating the Task to a Multiple-Use Engineer-
Dominated Agency May Be a Recipe for Failure .... 943
C. Adaptive Management is a Key Ingredient ......... 945
V. Conclusion: A Restoration RX ......................... 947
I. INTRODUCTION
Ecosystem restoration is fast becoming the third major strategy of
the modern environmental era, which began in the 1960s by seeking
to mitigate the effects of conventional, exploitation-dominated re-
source management and then, in the 1970s, turned to pollution pre-
vention and preservation of wildlife, recreational opportunities, and
other multiple uses.1 The goals of recent restoration plans are any-
thing but simple. Those who seek to restore any ecosystem must deal
with two separate problems. The first is a social problem, which is an
attempt to define goals and objectives, or to develop a collective sense
of what society wants. Closely tied to that articulation of "what we
want" is the complex array of pre-existing and emerging social struc-
tures-laws, policies, and institutions that frame the options for
achieving a vision of restoration. The second problem is scientific, in
which experts attempt to lay out a range of ecological trajectories,
structures (such as biological diversity), and functions that define pos-
sible restoration outcomes. Almost invariably, the first problem (what
do we want?) overshadows the second problem (what can we get?) in
implementation. As a result, both goals become difficult if not impos-
sible to attain and, over time, both ecological and social restoration
aspirations fail.
A key challenge for designers and managers of restoration plans is
to recognize the interplay between, and constraints imposed by, both
the sociopolitical and biophysical worlds. By weaving ecological prin-
ciples and legal analysis together, we hope to shed light on the suc-
cesses and failures of two landmark restoration projects: the Grand
Canyon of the Colorado River and the Florida Everglades. These
projects share common goals-to restore degraded habitat and to
1. ROBERT W. ADLER, RESTORING COLORADo RIVER ECOSYSTEMS: A TROUBLED SENSE
OF IMMENSITY 7-11, 113-14 (2007) [hereinafter ADLER, TROUBLED SENSE]; Joseph
L. Sax, The New Age of Environmental Restoration, 41 WASHBURN L.J. 1, 13
(2001).
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maintain water supplies. They also share a common problem-mak-
ing meaningful progress towards restoration goals. In the Grand Can-
yon, modest successes have been achieved through an adaptive
management program that attempts to blend the social and ecological
objectives. In the Everglades, however, the restoration approach has
separated the ecological from the social, legal, and political domains,
and as a result has accomplished very little.2
The successes and failures of these experiments in ecosystem res-
toration are a result of many factors. In this Article, we focus on three
elemental ingredients. The first is the emerging system property of
resilience, a concept that describes a more complex model of change
and restoration than typical resource management goals related to
maximizing social uses and achieving optimum yields of resource out-
puts. Resilience is a characteristic of both social and ecological sys-
tems. Resilience theory suggests that complex systems can exist in
fundamentally different regimes, and resilience is the property that
mediates transitions among those regimes. Hence resilience must be
overcome when undertaking objectives that involve regime changes,
such as an ecological restoration or a social transformation. In fact, a
comparative analysis of the Grand Canyon and Everglades projects
reveals that resilience may not always be a good thing, particularly
when it exhibits itself as entrenched stakeholder interests or institu-
tions that do not embrace change.
A second significant factor in achieving restoration goals is legisla-
tion and other legal requirements, which can either enable or con-
strain ecosystem restoration. The Grand Canyon Protection Act of
19923 and the Everglades restoration provisions of the Water Re-
sources Development Act of 20004 specifically authorize restoration.
At the same time, existing, generally applicable legislation, such as
the Clean Water Act5 and the Endangered Species Act,6 remains in
play and adds to the complexities of ecosystem restoration.
The third factor involves the administration of legislation through
agencies' initiatives and public participation, particularly stakeholder
involvement. Whether combative, collaborative, or somewhere in be-
tween, the participants' commitment to experimentation and adapta-
tion in the implementation of a restoration plan has a profound
influence on the speed and trajectory of restoration.
2. See COMm. ON INDEP. SCIENTIFIC REVIEW OF EVERGLADES RESTORATION PROGRESS,
NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, PROGRESS TOWARD RESTORING THE EVERGLADES: THE
SECOND BIENNIAL REVIEW (2008).
3. Grand Canyon Protection Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-575, §§ 1801-1809, 106
Stat. 4600, 4669-73.
4. Water Resources Development Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-541, § 601(b)(1)(A),
114 Stat. 2572, 2681.
5. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (2000).
6. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (2006).
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The remainder of this Article is structured as follows. Part II dis-
cusses the concept of resilience and how it underpins notions of resto-
ration and sustainability. National legislative goals and requirements
related to these concepts are then described. Next, Part III takes a
close look at the physical characteristics and specific legislative direc-
tives for the Everglades and the Grand Canyon. Part IV sets forth
several "lessons learned" from these two restoration projects. Finally,
Part V concludes with broader observations about restoration and re-
silience. Success is not possible, and failure may be inevitable, unless
the science of ecology, environmental law, and public administration
are calibrated to foster experimentation, learning, and adaptation in
management strategies.
II. RESILIENCE THEORY, SUSTAINABILITY AND
ECOSYSTEM RESTORATION
In common parlance, to restore is "to bring back to or put back into
a former or original state."7 More specifically, the National Research
Council defines restoration as "returning an ecosystem to a close ap-
proximation of its condition prior to disturbance."8 But how close
must the approximation be? How will we decide? To the best of our
knowledge, no existing restoration plan in the United States strives
for full restoration to the original, pre-disturbance state but rather to
a condition that resembles a more natural, functional state where
both humans and non-human life can exist.9 Thus, a health-based
definition may be most useful in the ecological restoration context-
"to bring back to a healthy and vigorous state."10
Restoration plans exist, and must succeed or fail, within three
spheres: scientific, socioeconomic, and legal. Ecologists question, test,
7. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE
UNABRIDGED 1936 (Philip Babcock Gove ed., 1971).
8. COMM. ON RESTORATION OF AQUATIC ECOSYSTEMS: SCI., TECH. & PUB. POLICY,
NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, RESTORATION OF AQUATIC ECOSYSTEMS: SCIENCE, TECH-
NOLOGY AND PUBLIC POLICY 2 (1992).
9. The Everglades Plan, for example, defines restoration as "the recovery and pro-
tection of the South Florida ecosystem so that it once again achieves and sustains
those essential hydrological and biological characteristics that defined the undis-
turbed South Florida ecosystem." 33 C.F.R. § 385.3 (2008). The plan is not de-
signed to "completely replicate the undisturbed South Florida ecosystem," but
rather to restore the ecosystem to a condition that is "significantly healthier than
the current system." Id. For details, see infra Part III.A.
10. Alyson C. Flournoy, Restoration Rx: An Evaluation and Prescription, 42 ARiz. L.
REV. 187, 189 (2000) (citing OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 756 (2d ed. 1989)). Pro-
fessor Flournoy analyzes restoration challenges by drawing on metaphors from
the medical profession: diagnosis, informed consent, holistic approaches to heal-
ing, refrain from action when harm would result ("First, do no harm"), ongoing
assessment to avoid overdose or misapplication, and preventative medicine, in-
cluding lifestyle changes, wherever possible. Id. at 213.
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and develop an understanding of current (altered) and past (func-
tional or perhaps natural) physical and biological processes in an
ecosystem, while stakeholders and other members of the public de-
velop values and prioritize socioeconomic restoration objectives."
Those values and priorities are expressed through law and legal insti-
tutions. Lawyers and law-makers, then, must determine whether the
existing legal framework accommodates ecological learning, meaning-
ful public participation, political action, and restoration success or,
conversely, whether laws and legal institutions must adapt to the new
restoration vision.12
The concepts of resilience, adaptive management, and sustainable
development are explored below, followed by an assessment of related
national legislative goals and requirements.
A. Resilience, Adaptive Management, and Sustainable
Development
Ecosystem resilience is the capacity of an ecosystem to tolerate dis-
turbance without changing into a qualitatively different state. 13 In
other words, resilience describes the ability "to persist, buffer, and
adapt to recurrent shocks without fundamentally changing, often un-
predictably, into highly altered systems."14 Resilience of linked social-
ecological systems has the added capacity of humans to anticipate and
plan for the future-the ability to build and increase the capacity for
learning and to take advantage of feedback loops that foster
adaptation.15
In many cases, the lack of ecosystem resilience manifests itself by
transformation-a regime shift. In ecosystems, a regime or state is
defined by a set of ecological processes and structures. Regime shifts
have occurred in hundreds of ecosystems around the world, including
lakes, grasslands, wetlands, and coral reefs.16 Semi-arid rangelands
that are overgrazed suddenly flip from a grass dominated regime to
one with shrubs. Freshwater lakes alternate between a clear water
11. Duncan T. Patten, Restoration of Wetland and Riparian Systems: The Role of Sci-
ence, Adaptive Management, History, and Values, 134 J. CONTEMP. WATER RE-
SOURCES & EDUC. 9, 17 (2006).
12. Flournoy, supra note 10, at 212.
13. C.S. Holling, Resilience and Stability of Ecological Systems, 4 ANN. REV. ECOLOGY
& SYSTEMATICS 1, 17 (1973).
14. Terence P. Hughes et al., Adaptive Management of the Great Barrier Reef and the
Grand Canyon World Heritage Areas, 36 AMno 586, 586 (2007).
15. RESILIENCE AND THE BEHAVIOR OF LARGE SCALE SYSTEMS 3-6 (Lance H. Gunder-
son & Lowell Pritchard, Jr. eds., 2002).
16. Carl Folke et al., Regime Shifts, Resilience and Biodiversity in Ecosystem Man-
agement, 35 ANN. REV. ECOLOGY, EVOLUTION & SYSTEMATICS 557, 559-67 (2004).
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state and a turbid water state.17 Coral reef systems shift between
coral domination and macro-algae domination.'S The loss of resilience
and ensuing flip in many of these cases can be traced to prior manage-
ment efforts that stabilized or attempted to hold the system in a so-
cially desired state, often for the purpose of promoting maximum
yields of timber, forage, fish, or other natural resources.
In complex social-ecological systems, regimes can be defined by
ecological states as well as social, political, and legal arrangements.
Many times, the regime shifts in these systems are triggered by a col-
lapse or crisis that results in a fundamentally new set of relationships.
As with ecosystems, resilience is defined by how much variation the
system can absorb before it changes regimes.
Restoration management generally strives to move a system from
an undesired state to a more desirable one. Restoring the Everglades,
the Grand Canyon, the Louisiana Coast, or the San Francisco Bay
Delta involves creating new ecological and social regimes. Restoration
is complex and requires the development of integrated solutions, not
piecemeal tinkering. It is the great uncertainty that accompanies
complex restorations that led to an approach called adaptive manage-
ment.' 9 Adaptive management strives to build capacity to anticipate
environmental and social change and to inform decision-makers and
stakeholders of alternative pathways and the potential consequences
of choosing among those pathways. 20 There is wide consensus among
ecologists that experimentation and adaptive management are neces-
sary to achieve resilient ecosystems.21
In the context of restoration management (or moving the system
from an undesired regime to another, more desirable one), the goal of
a resilience-based approach is not equilibrium, nor is it optimum yield
of ecosystem services and products. 22 Rather, the goals are learning,
flexibility, and diversity. Connectedness and stability increase while
the ecological capital of nutrients and biomass (or, in social systems,
institutional networks and mutual trust) accumulate. Meanwhile,
windows of opportunity open on a smaller scale within the system
17. MARTEN SCHEFFER, ECOLOGY OF SHALLOW LAKEs, at xiv (1998); see also Mary
Jane Angelo, Stumbling Toward Success: A Story of Adaptive Law and Ecological
Resilience, 87 NEB. L. REV. (2009) (describing Lake Apopka's shift from clear to
eutrophic state).
18. Terence P. Hughes, Catastrophes, Phase Shifts, and Large-Scale Degradation of a
Caribbean Coral Reef, 265 Sci. 1547, 1547 (1994).
19. ADAPTIVE ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT AND MANAGEMENT 7-9, 19-20 (C.S. Hol-
ling ed., 1978).
20. Hughes et al., supra note 14, at 587.
21. See infra Part II.B.4.
22. Lance Gunderson & Stephen S. Light, Adaptive Management and Adaptive Gov-
ernance in the Everglades Ecosystem, 39 POL'Y Sci. 323, 324 (2006).
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through experimentation, but the results do not trigger cascading in-
stability of the whole because of the resiliency of the whole. 2 3
Although the concepts may sound similar, it is important to note
that resilience thinking is a major departure from the conventional
approach to natural resources management, which, under U.S. law,
has been dominated by maximum yield objectives. 24 There is a strong
relationship, however, between resilience and sustainable develop-
ment, which has become a persistent theme in international environ-
mental law. As such, approaches that incorporate resilience thinking
go hand-in-hand with contemporary sustainable development goals. 2 5
This proposition is not necessarily self-evident. One might well ask
whether development of our natural resources can occur in a fashion
that is sustainable over time, given the physical limitations of our en-
vironment and the political impetus for maintaining and even ex-
panding our economic well-being, and, if so, whether sustainable
development is necessarily compatible with resilient ecosystems.
The 1987 Brundtland Report, Our Common Future, defines sus-
tainable development as "development that meets the needs of the
present without compromising the ability of future generations to
meet their own needs."26 In other words, "[s]ustainability is a rela-
tionship between dynamic human economic systems and larger, dy-
namic, but normally slower-changing ecological systems .. .in which
the effects of human activities remain within bounds so as not to de-
stroy the health and integrity of self-organizing systems."27
A management philosophy based on sustainable development re-
orients the use and allocation of natural resources from maximum
yield objectives to approaches designed to ensure the availability of a
diverse array of ecological resources and services for present and fu-
ture generations. 28 Resource use and consumption occurs only in a
time, place, and manner that allows regeneration and continuity into
the future. The concept of sustainable development also strives for
both intergenerational equity and distributive justice in the access to
essential resources among human communities, be they wealthy or
impoverished.29
23. Resilience Alliance, Key Concepts: Resilience, http://www.resalliance.org/576.php
(last visited Jan. 13, 2009).
24. See infra Part II.B.1.
25. Gunderson & Light, supra note 22, at 324.
26. WORLD COMM'N ON ENV'T & DEV., OUR COMMON FUTURE 43 (1987).
27. Bryan G. Norton, A New Paradigm for Environmental Management, in EcosYs-
TEM HEALTH 25 (Robert Constanza et al. eds., 1992).
28. Sandra Zellmer, A Preservation Paradox: Political Prestidigitation and an En-
during Resource of Wildness, 34 ENVTL. L. 1015, 1038 (2004).
29. Id. On sustainable development objectives, see John C. Dernbach, Sustainable
Development: Now More Than Ever, 32 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,003,
10,012 (2002); Giinther Handl, Environmental Security and Global Change: The
2009] 899
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At its core, then, "[s]ustainability is the capacity to create, test, and
maintain adaptive capability" so that social-ecological systems con-
tinue in predictable trajectories and avoid collapse. 30 By the same to-
ken, development is the process of creating, testing, and maintaining
opportunity. Thus, sustainable development is not an oxymoron, but
a logical partnership.
Resilience, though known more widely as an ecological concept
than as a legal imperative, dovetails with sustainable development. A
resilience approach helps to focus attention on the specific attributes
or drivers of complex social-ecological systems and to craft guiding
principles for human intervention to improve the long-term perform-
ance of the systems.3 1 A resilience approach enables resource manag-
ers to categorize observed patterns, frame relevant questions, and
apply insights gleaned from one system to the management of an-
other.32 Change is inevitable in complex systems, and resilience the-
ory helps us learn, adapt, and manage for change, instead of against
change.33
As described below, however, the nation's body of law tends to re-
sist change and protect the status quo to avoid upsetting settled ex-
pectations of property owners, regulated entities, and the
marketplace. Against this backdrop, promoting adaptation and over-
all resilience through ecosystem restoration is challenging, to say the
least.
B. National Legislative Goals
National legislation governing water quality, biological conserva-
tion, and the production of resource outputs plays a significant role in
restoration efforts. The basic playing field is dominated by maximum
sustained yield ("MSY") concepts related to multiple use management
Challenge to International Law, 1 Y.B. INT'L ENVTL. L. 3, 29 (1990); Graham
Mayeda, Where Should Johannesburg Take Us? Ethical and Legal Approaches to
Sustainable Development in the Context of International Environmental Law, 15
COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 29, 31-34 (2004); Michael McCloskey, The Em-
peror Has No Clothes: The Conundrum of Sustainable Development, 9 DUKE
ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F. 153, 154 (1999).
30. C. S. Holling et al., Discoveries for Sustainable Futures, in PANARcHY: UNDER-
STANDING TRANSFORMATIONS IN HUMAN AND NATURAL SYSTEMS 403 (Lance H.
Gunderson & C.S. Holling eds., 2002). For a description of instances throughout
history where civilizations have collapsed when ecological regime shifts occurred,
see JARED DIAMOND, COLLAPSE: How SOCIETIES CHOOSE TO FAIL OR SUCCEED
(2005).
31. John M. Anderies et al., Fifteen Weddings and a Funeral: Case Studies and Resil-
ience-based Management, 11 ECOLOGY & Soc'Y 1, 2 (2006).
32. Id. at 6.
33. Id. at 7; Ralf Yorque et al., Toward an Integrative Synthesis, in PANARCHY: UN-
DERSTANDING TRANSFORMATIONS IN HUMAN AND NATURAL SYSTEMS 419-38 (Lance
H. Gunderson & C.S. Holling eds., 2002).
[Vol. 87:893
GLEN CANYON AND THE EVERGLADES
of forest, fish, range resources, and water resources. Meanwhile, re-
cent restoration efforts in the Everglades and the Grand Canyon are
being driven by environmental protection laws of 1970s vintage, par-
ticularly the Clean Water Act ("CWA") and the Endangered Species
Act ("ESA"), as well as a landmark in U.S. conservation law-the Na-
tional Park Service Organic Act. Most recently, many of the resource
management agencies have also begun to adopt adaptive management
techniques through their regulations and informal guidelines.
1. Multiple Use, Maximum Sustained Yield Mandates
a. Fish, Forests, and Rangelands
Many natural resources and most public lands (other than national
parks and congressionally-designated wilderness areas) are managed
pursuant to maximum sustained yield principles. 3 4 The concept is
perhaps most widely known and applied in the field of fisheries man-
agement, where it rapidly gained ascendancy during the post-World
War II years.35 According to ecologist P.A. Larkin in his 1976 keynote
address to the American Fisheries Society, "the dogma was this: any
species each year produces a harvestable surplus, and if you take that
much, and no more, you can go on getting it forever and ever
(Amen)."36
The dogma was embraced that same year by Congress in three sep-
arate statutes. First, in response to declining fish stocks domestically
and worldwide, 37 Congress adopted a type of maximum yield require-
ment in the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Manage-
34. For a critique of the MSY doctrine as applied to public lands, see George Cameron
Coggins, Of Succotash Syndromes and Vacuous Platitudes: The Meaning of"Mul-
tiple Use, Sustained Yield" for Public Land Management, 53 U. COLO. L. REV. 229
(1981) [hereinafter Coggins, Succotash].
35. See P.A. Larkin, Epitaph for the Concept of Maximum Sustained Yield, 106
TRANSACTIONS AM. FISHERIES SOC'Y 1, 1 (1977) ("The ten years following World
War II were the golden age for the concept of maximum sustained yield.").
36. Id. The parallel concept of "optimum yield" has been described as "a deliberate
melding of biological, economics, social, and political values designed to produce
the maximum." Id. at 8 (quoting Philip M. Roedel, A Summary and Critique of
the Symposium on Optimum Yield, in OPrIMuM SUSTAINABLE YIELD AS A CONCEPT
IN FISHERIES MANAGEMENT (1975)). Maximum yield is generally thought to re-
quire higher production outputs than optimal yield. Tommy T.B. Koh, The Exclu-
sive Economic Zone, 30 MALAYA L. REV. 1, 11 (1988). Optimal yield, however, can
'almost certainly be used primarily as a way of justifying a political course of
action." Larkin, supra note 35, at 8. Difficulties arise because both natural sys-
tems and social, economic, and political systems are so "sufficiently diverse and
complex that there is no single, simple recipe for harvesting that can be applied
universally." Id. at 9.
37. Carrie A. Tipton, Note, Protecting Tomorrow's Harvest: Developing a National
System of Individual Transferable Quotas to Conserve Ocean Resources, 14 VA.
ENVTL. L.J. 381, 386-87 (1995).
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ment Act.38 A principal objective of the Magnuson Act is the adoption
of fishery management plans that will "achieve and maintain, on a
continuing basis, the optimum yield from each fishery,"39 while
"minimiz[ing] adverse economic impacts" on fishing communities. 40
The Act defines optimum yield as the amount that provides the "great-
est overall benefit to the Nation particularly with respect to food pro-
duction and recreational opportunities" and which "is prescribed on
the basis of the maximum sustainable yield from the fishery, as re-
duced by any relevant social, economic or ecological factor."41 Unfor-
tunately, "as we all know, one cannot optimize for two things at the
same time, let alone a dozen" (give or take a few).42 In 1986, a blue
ribbon panel convened by the federal government criticized the vague-
ness of the MSY concept, explaining that it "has been, and still is, a
widely fluctuating guideline varied to suit the eyes of the beholder or
the needs of special interests."4 3 A stark example of the failures of
MSY fisheries management can be seen off the coast of Florida, where
many salt-water fish species are now in danger of extinction. 44
As for public lands management, 1976 was also a banner year for
the MSY concept for both timber and range resources. The National
Forest Management Act of 1976 and the Federal Land Policy and
Management Act ("FLPMA") of 1976 both built upon concepts articu-
lated in an earlier statute, the Multiple-Use Sustained-Yield Act of
1960 ("MUSYA").45 Sustained yield is defined by that Act as "the
achievement and maintenance in perpetuity of a high-level annual or
regular periodic output of the various renewable resources of the na-
tional forests without impairment of the productivity of the land."46
Earlier applications of this concept emphasized biophysical production
constraints on specified renewable resources, such as timber,47 to en-
38. 16. U.S.C. §§ 1801-1882 (2006). For an in-depth critique of the Magnuson Act,
see Kristen M. Fletcher, Fix It! Constructing a Recommendation to the Ocean
Commission for the Future of Fisheries, 8 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 93 (2002).
39. 16. U.S.C. § 1801(b)(4).
40. Id. § 1851(a)(8)(B).
41. Id. § 1802(33) (defining "'optimum' with respect to the yield from a fishery").
42. Larkin, supra note 35, at 10.
43. Kirsten M. Batkin, New Zealand's Quota Management System: A Solution To The
United States' Federal Fisheries Management Crisis?, 36 NAT. RESOURCES J. 855,
860 (1996) (citing NAT'L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., FISHERY MANAGEMENT
STUDY (1986)).
44. The Florida Environment, Salt Water Fish at Extinction Risk, http://www.florida
environment. havecom/programs/feOl2l8.htm (last visited Jan. 13, 2009). As for
nationwide declines in fisheries, see infra note 61.
45. 16 U.S.C. §§ 528-531.
46. Id. § 53 1(b) (defining "sustained yield of the several products and services").
47. Fred Bosselman, A Role for State Planning: Intergenerational Equity and Adap-
tive Management, 12 U. FLA. J.L. & PuB. POL'Y 311, 313 n.3 (2001); Barry Sadler,
Shared Resources, Common Future: Sustainable Management of Canada-United
States Border Waters, 33 NAT. RESOURCES J. 375, 376 (1993). Contemporaries
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sure maximum production, with little or no regard to wildlife, recrea-
tion, or other values.48 By adding a multiple-use component to the
equation, however, Congress intended to expand the production-ori-
ented focus of historic resource management. 49 Accordingly, the Mul-
tiple-Use Sustained-Yield Act defines multiple use as "[t]he
management of all the various renewable surface resources of the na-
tional forests so that they are utilized in the combination that will
best meet the needs of the American people."50 Congress also added a
provision requiring that "due consideration"51 be given to recreation,
watersheds, fisheries, and wildlife, but gave little concrete guidance
for resolving conflicts among uses, instead leaving vast discretion in
the agency's hands.5 2 The National Forest Management Act of 1976
placed parameters on agency discretion by requiring management
plans for federal forests and grasslands and by specifying that the
plans must provide for diversity of plant and animal resources, plus
MSY, as well as public involvement and judicial review.53
Congress also required MSY management for Bureau of Land
Management lands when it enacted FLPMA in 1976.54 FLPMA ex-
presses a national policy that public lands be managed "on the basis of
multiple use and sustained yield."55 Like the Multiple-Use Sustained-
Yield Act of 1960, FLPMA defines "sustained yield" as "the achieve-
ment and maintenance in perpetuity of a high-level annual or regular
and associates of President Theodore Roosevelt, a leader of the early twentieth
century conservation movement, viewed sustainability as "foresight and restraint
in the exploitation of the physical sources of wealth as necessary for the
perpetuity of civilization and the welfare of present and future generations."
SEAN DENNIS CASHMAN, AMERICA IN THE AGE OF THE TITANS: THE PROGRESSIVE
ERA AND WORLD WAR I 78 (1988).
48. See Elli Louka, Cutting the Gordian Knot: Why International Environmental Law
is Not Only About the Protection of the Environment, 10 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J.
79, 113 (1996) (citing ALEXANDER S. MATHER, GLOBAL FOREST RESOURCES 185-97
(1990)).
49. Sierra Club v. Butz, [1973] 3 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 20,292, 20,292-93
(9th Cir. Mar. 16, 1973); CHARLES F. WILKINSON & H. MICHAEL ANDERSON, LAND
AND RESOURCE PLANNING IN THE NATIONAL FORESTS 285-87 (1987).
50. 16 U.S.C. § 531(a). This provision was subsequently carried over into the Na-
tional Forest Management Act of 1976, which incorporates multiple use and MSY
principles and which explicitly includes "outdoor recreation, range, timber, wa-
tershed, wildlife and fish, and wilderness" among the recognized uses. Id.
§ 1604(e)(1).
51. Id. § 529.
52. See Strickland v. Morton, 519 F.2d 467, 469 (9th Cir. 1975) (stating that the Mul-
tiple-Use Sustained-Yield Act "breathe[s] discretion at every pore").
53. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1604(a), (c), (g)(3)(B), 1612.
54. Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-579, 90 Stat.
2745 (codified as amended at 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1782 and scattered sections of
15, 16, 30, 31, 40, 42 and 43 U.S.C.). For a discussion of the MSY doctrine as
applied to BLM and other public lands, see Coggins, Succotash, supra note 34.
55. 43 U.S.C. § 1701(a)(7)-(8) (2000).
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periodic output of the various renewable resources of the public lands
consistent with multiple use."5 6 "Multiple use," in turn, is defined as
"a combination of balanced and diverse resource uses that takes into
account the long-term needs of future generations for renewable and
nonrenewable resources."57 FLPMA also proclaims that the public
lands should be managed "in a manner which recognizes the Nation's
need for domestic sources of minerals, food, timber, and fiber," without
causing unnecessary or undue degradation. 58
Only one year after FLPMA, NFMA, and the Magnuson Act were
enacted, Larkin declared that the concept of maximum sustained
yield, at least as applied to fisheries management, was, or should be,
dead.59 He wrote an epitaph entitled "M. S. Y. 1930s-1970s":
Here lies the concept, MSY
It advocated yields too high,
And didn't spell out how to slice the pie.
We bury it with the best of wishes,
Especially on behalf of fishes.
We don't know yet what will take its place,
But hope it's as good for the human race.6 0
So what went wrong? Precipitous declines in fish stocks 6 1 can be
attributed in large part to a failure of fisheries managers to appreciate
the uncertainties of complex systems and to adapt their techniques in
response to new learning.6 2 According to Larkin, "[n]o one can deny
that hypothetical animal populations can produce hypothetical maxi-
mum sustained yields, but the same cannot be said of real animal
56. Id. § 1702(h). This definition is almost identical to that found in the MUSYA.
See 16 U.S.C. § 531(b) (defining "sustained yield of the several products and ser-
vices" as "the achievement and maintenance in perpetuity of a high-level annual
or regular periodic output of the various renewable resources of the national for-
ests without impairment of the productivity of the land").
57. 43 U.S.C. § 1702(c). This definition is similar to that found in the MUSYA, ex-
cept that the FLPMA lists ten specific resources ("recreation, range, timber, min-
erals, watershed, wildlife and fish, and natural scenic, scientific and historical
values") and expresses the goal of no impairment to land and resources. Id.
58. Id. §§ 1701(12), 1732(b).
59. Larkin, supra note 35, at 10.
60. Id.
61. See Josh EAGLE ET AL., TAKING STOCK OF THE REGIONAL FISHERY MANAGEMENT
CouNciLs 4 (2003), available at http://fisheries.stanford.edu/StanfordCounciL
Report.pdf (noting that more than one-third of the nation's coastal fish stocks are
"overfished"); Juliet Eilperin, World Seafood Supply Could Run Out by 2048, Re-
searchers Warn, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 3, 2006, at A2 (warning of the demise of
worldwide fisheries); supra note 44 and accompanying text (noting the decline of
Florida's coastal fisheries).
62. See Fletcher, supra note 38, at 133 ("[Tlhe technology of catching fish overtook
fisheries science, leaving stock assessment and ecosystem analysis behind as
fisheries began to crash in regions across the United States.").
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populations that are really being harvested."6 3 He recommended a
shift in management paradigms using newly minted adaptive man-
agement approaches: "consider[ ] much more sophisticated techniques
for optimization and adaptive control in fisheries management"6 4 be-
cause "[the world today is too complex for the rough justice of a guy
on a horse with a six-shooter."6 5
The perceived demise of the MSY standard for public lands man-
agement soon followed, at least in academic commentary. In 1981,
Professor George Coggins proclaimed that MSY was dying under its
own weight.6 6 Others have noted that MSY's time has passed, be-
cause the concept has failed to maintain "sustainable ecosystems sup-
porting a variety of renewable resources" 6 7 and instead has caused
extensive environmental degradation.6S We explore resilience, sus-
tainability, and adaptive management concepts as possible replace-
ments for MSY below. 69
b. Water Resources Development, Flood Control, and
Floodplain Management
The Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act of 1899 gives the Corps
of Engineers broad authority to prevent obstructions to navigation
and to promote the federal navigational servitude, including transpor-
tation improvement and flood control efforts on mainstems and
63. Larkin, supra note 35, at 3; see id. at 4 ("[Flor even a single species population it
does not seem likely that an MSY based on the analysis of the historic statistics
of a fishery is really attainable on a sustained basis. If there is an MSY, it is a
yield associated with a high risk of recruitment failure in a population in which
the less productive substocks have been depressed or eliminated.").
64. Id. at 3-4. More specifically, we should put "the fish first, the economics second,
and the social problems a distant third-something we must resolve, and quickly,
with sympathy and good sense." Id. at 10.
65. Id. at 10.
66. George Cameron Coggins, The Changing Face of Federal Public Land and Re-
sources Law: 1971 to 1999 and Beyond, SE55 ALI-ABA 179, 188 (2000) (attribut-
ing the demise of MSY to the creation of wilderness areas and other "preservation
zones," so that instead of many multiple uses there are really only two major use
categories: commodity production and pleasure).
67. Michael C. Blumm, Public Choice Theory and the Public Lands: Why "Multiple
Use" Failed, 18 HARv. ENVTL. L. REV. 405, 429 (1994).
68. Robert B. Keiter, Public Lands and Law Reform: Putting Theory, Policy, and
Practice in Perspective, 2005 UTAH L. REV. 1127, 1162 (2005). But see Debra L.
Donahue, Federal Rangeland Policy: Perverting Law and Jeopardizing Ecosystem
Services, 22 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 299, 332-33 (2007) (concurring that the
concepts of multiple use and sustained yield have "failed to produce sustainable
public land ecosystems," but arguing that "[t]he blame lies with the agencies, for
failing to interpret the statutes rationally or in the public interest and for not
incorporating contemporary ecological understanding into management prescrip-
tions, and with the courts for not enforcing congressional intent in the governing
legislation").
69. See infra Parts III-IV.
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tributaries of navigable waters. 70 The Flood Control Act of 1936
("FCA") explicitly recognizes federal responsibility for flood control
measures nationwide.7 1
Although the nation has received significant benefits from the de-
ployment of federal resources to prevent or mitigate flooding, it has
also experienced significant detriments, fiscally, socially, and ecologi-
cally. The FCA affords the Corps broad-sweeping discretion to con-
duct any project it chooses whenever "the benefits to whomsoever they
may accrue are in excess of the estimated costs." 72 Since 1936, the
Corps has spent billions of dollars on dams, reservoirs, levees, and
other structures for flood control and related purposes, many of which
had minimal or even no benefits to the American public, and many of
which had catastrophic effects on fish and wildlife species and hydro-
logical function. 7 3
In addition to the FCA, project-specific directives and appropria-
tions are provided to the Corps through periodic Water Resources De-
velopment Acts, one of which provided the blueprint for Everglades
restoration efforts. 74 Water resources development is also influenced
by state laws governing the allocation and use of water quantities.
For the Colorado River, this generally entails the "first in time, first in
right" dictates of prior appropriation law, while in Florida and the rest
of the East, it allows reasonable uses of water as authorized by ripa-
rian water law. 75
2. Integrity of Water Resources
Throughout the United States, flow alterations caused by dams, flood
control levees, channelization, and water diversions, along with sedi-
mentation and nutrient pollution from non-point sources-particu-
larly agriculture and construction sites-have significantly degraded
the integrity of wetlands, rivers, and lakes. The CWA proclaims an
ambitious congressional goal: "to restore and maintain the chemical,
70. 33 U.S.C. §§ 401, 407 (2000). In the West, the Bureau of Reclamation is charged
with constructing and delivery of water from federal reclamation projects for irri-
gation and other purposes, including flood control, under the Reclamation Act of
1902. See id. §§ 371-390h; infra note 340 (describing Reclamation programs).
71. 33 U.S.C. § 701a.
72. Id.
73. Christine A. Klein, On Dams and Democracy, 78 OR. L. REV. 641, 679-81 (1999).
For details, see Christine A. Klein & Sandra B. Zellmer, Mississippi River Sto-
ries: Lesson from a Century of Unnatural Disasters, 60 S.M.U. L. REV. 1471
(2007); infra notes 341-44 and accompanying text.
74. See infra notes 157-59 and accompanying text.
75. See infra Parts II.A (describing Florida water law), III.B (describing the law gov-
erning the Colorado River).
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physical, and biological integrity of the Nation's waters."76 This stat-
ute has been a primary driver in restoration efforts in the Everglades.
The key mechanism for accomplishing the CWA's goals is section
301, which prohibits "the discharge of any pollutant by any person"
unless a permit is obtained.77 The Act has two major permit pro-
grams. Section 404 controls discharges of dredged or fill materials by
authorizing the Corps of Engineers to issue permits "for the discharge
of dredged or fill material into the navigable waters at specified dispo-
sal sites."78 The Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") retains
oversight and veto power over permits if "unacceptable adverse ef-
fect[s]" to the environment would result. 79 Individual permits are
evaluated on a case-by-case basis, while general or nationwide per-
mits may be issued for categories of activities that are similar in na-
ture and have only minimal impacts.8 0 To receive an individual
permit, the project proponent must first demonstrate that there are no
practical alternatives to the destruction of wetlands.8 1 The agencies
presume that a practical alternative exists if the project is not water-
dependent. Second, steps must be taken to minimize the adverse ef-
fects of development on wetlands.8 2 Finally, if damage to the wet-
lands cannot be avoided or minimized, the permittee must compensate
for the damages by creating or purchasing replacement wetlands.8 3
The National Pollution Discharge Elimination System ("NPDES")
permit program of CWA section 402 requires permits for "the dis-
charge of any pollutant, or combination of pollutants" by any person.8 4
The CWA defines "discharge of pollutant" as "any addition of any pol-
lutant to navigable waters from any point source."s 5 Both "pollutant"
and "navigable waters" are defined quite broadly, but "point source" is
a term of art meaning "any discernible, confined and discrete convey-
ance, including but not limited to any pipe, ditch, channel, tunnel, con-
duit, well, . . . concentrated animal feeding operation, or vessel or
other floating craft, from which pollutants are or may be dis-
charged."8 6 The point source concept was developed so that pollution
76. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a).
77. Id. § 1311(a).
78. Id. § 1344(a).
79. Id. § 1344(c).
80. Id. § 1344(e).
81. Memorandums of Agreement (MOA); Clean Water Act Section 404(b)(1) Guide-
lines; Correction, 55 Fed. Reg. 9210, 9212 (March 12, 1990).
82. 40 C.F.R. § 230.10(d) (2008) ("[N]o discharge of dredged or filled material shall
be permitted unless appropriate and practicable steps have been taken which will
minimize potential adverse impacts of the discharge on the aquatic ecosystem.").
83. Id. §§ 230.91(c)(2), 230.92.
84. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a)(1).
85. Id. § 1362(12).
86. Id. § 1362(14). Agricultural stormwater discharges and irrigation return flows
are excluded from the definition. Id.
2009]
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
from simple erosion or run-off could be distinguished from pollution
that has been collected or originates from confined systems.
As a result of the NPDES program, chemical pollutants from point
sources have been reduced significantly, but non-point source pollu-
tion remains virtually uncontrolled.8 7 Programs directed at non-point
source pollution, which includes a broad range of activities such as
farming and construction run-off, are left to state and local efforts.
Unlike the permitting provisions for point sources, the EPA lacks di-
rect regulatory authority over non-point sources, but it may withhold
funding for states that do not take timely steps to address non-point
pollution.88 In addition, states are required to establish water quality
standards ("WQS"), which are comprised of designated uses for water-
ways within the state and standards sufficient to meet those uses.
Waterways that do not meet WQS will be listed as impaired and total
maximum daily loads ("TMDLs") must be set.8 9 TMDLs are applied to
point sources through the NPDES permit program, but mechanisms
for applying them to non-point sources are unclear. As a result, the
track record for WQS implementation has been unimpressive and the
health of freshwater systems is continuing to decline.90
Large numbers of urban watersheds remain chemically impaired because of
pathogens, phosphorus, insecticides, herbicides, and toxics from municipal
and industrial sources; and many rural watersheds remain chemically im-
paired as a result of nutrients, sediment, and agricultural chemicals....
Likewise, a recent assessment.., of the National Research Council reported
widespread hydrologic, geomorphic, and other impairment of riparian habi-
tats, along with accompanying impacts to water quality and aquatic ecosys-
tem health. The report documents as much as ninety-five percent loss of
natural vegetation in some riparian areas, "indicating that riparian areas are
some of the most severely altered landscapes in the country."91
Thus, despite the strengths of the CWA, restoration goals remain
elusive in degraded waterways of the Everglades and elsewhere. 9 2
Achieving the goals of the CWA would require restoration and mainte-
nance of "the entire aquatic ecosystem and the human and ecological
communities that rely on it,"93 but longstanding and deeply en-
trenched management approaches are designed and implemented in a
87. Robert W. Adler, The Two Lost Books in the Water Quality Trilogy: The Elusive
Objectives of Physical and Biological Integrity, 33 ENVTL. L. 29, 49 (2003) [herein-
after Adler, Two Lost Books].
88. Id. at 47, 56.
89. 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d).
90. OLIVER A. HOUCK, THE CLEAN WATER ACT TMDL PROGRAM: LAW, POLICY, AND
IMPLEMENTATION 5, 63 (2d ed. 2002).
91. Adler, Two Lost Books, supra note 87, at 49, 52. Adler also notes that "aquatic
species are declining at a far more alarming rate than are terrestrial species." Id.
at 50.
92. See infra Part III.A.
93. WILLIAM L. ANDREEN & SHANA CAMPBELL JONES, THE CLEAN WATER ACT: A
BLUEPRINT FOR REFORM 52 (2008).
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fashion that exploits water resources rather than restoring or main-
taining their ecological integrity.9 4
3. Biological Conservation and Park Lands
The ESA sets forth a goal that is at least as ambitious as that
found in the CWA: to conserve and recover imperiled species and their
habitat in order to avoid extinction. 9 5 The Act is "notable both for its
unequivocal prioritization of imperiled species and their habitats and
for its simple and nearly uncompromising regulatory approach." 96
Restoration plans, including the Grand Canyon and Everglades
plans, are often stimulated by two key provisions of the ESA, both of
which kick in once a species is listed as endangered or threatened. 9 7
First, federal agencies must consult with the Fish and Wildlife Service
("FWS")98 to assure that their actions will not jeopardize the contin-
ued existence of the species or adversely modify their critical
habitat.99 This requirement entails both a procedural requirement to
consult as well as a substantive duty to avoid jeopardy or adverse
modification.10 0 Agency decisions under the ESA must be based on
the "best scientific ... data available."1o1 Second, the ESA prohibits
any person from taking endangered species, either directly by hunt-
ing, harassing, or killing, or indirectly by altering habitat in a way
that would harm the species.1o 2
The protection of biological resources is also advanced by the Na-
tional Park Service Organic Act of 1916, which is integral to the man-
agement of the Everglades and the Grand Canyon, where areas of the
larger ecosystems have been designated as National Parks. 0 3 The
Act specifies a dual management purpose of preservation and public
use by requiring the Park Service to "conserve the scenery and the
94. Id.
95. 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b) (2006).
96. Sandra B. Zellmer, A New Corps of Discovery for Missouri River Management, 83
NEB. L. REV. 305, 319-20 (2004).
97. See 16 U.S.C. § 1533 (listing criteria).
98. Where marine species are involved, consultation duties are delegated to the Na-
tional Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration-Fisheries.
99. 16 U.S.C. § 1536. To cause jeopardy is to lessen the likelihood of species' survival
and recovery. 50 C.F.R. § 402.02 (2008) (defining "jeopardize the continued exis-
tence of").
100. Thomas v. Peterson, 753 F.2d 754 (9th Cir. 1985).
101. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1533(b)(1)(A), 1536(a)(2), (c)(1). For a thorough assessment of the
"best available science" requirement, see Holly Doremus, The Purposes, Effects,
and Future of the Endangered Species Act's Best Available Science Mandate, 34
ENVT'L L. 397 (2004) [hereinafter Doremus, Mandate].
102. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1538(a)(1), 1532(19); Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a
Greater Or., 515 U.S. 687 (1995) (upholding the EPA's interpretation of"harm" to
include habitat modification).
103. 16 U.S.C. §§ 221, 410.
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natural and historic objects and the wild life therein and to provide for
the enjoyment of the same in such manner and by such means as will
leave them unimpaired for the enjoyment of future generations."' 0 4
Similarly, acts governing the Everglades and the Grand Canyon direct
that certain lands be set apart as public parks "for the benefit and
enjoyment of the people."1o5 Both are to be managed according to the
Organic Act and specific directives applicable to each area.1 0 6 In man-
aging the Everglades, the Park Service is directed "to maintain the
natural abundance, diversity, and ecological integrity of native plants
and animals, as well as the behavior of native animals, as a part of
their ecosystem."10 7 By the same token, the Grand Canyon is to be
managed to conserve the remarkable scientific and aesthetic values
for which it was initially set aside as a National Monument in
1908.108
Although the MSY mandate does not apply within the parks them-
selves, it does apply to surrounding public lands. Thus, timber har-
vest, grazing, mining, water development, and other production-
oriented management measures outside of the parks can have signifi-
cant impacts on park resources.' 0 9
4. Adaptive Management
The origins of adaptive management theory can be traced to C.S.
Holling and C.J. Walters.110 Although the concept has gained signifi-
cant traction in the physical and biological sciences, and has, of late,
been given a good deal of attention in social and legal circles, there is
104. Id. § 1.
105. Id. 88 410 (Everglades), 221 (Grand Canyon).
106. Id. § 410r-7(a), 222.
107. Id. § 410r-7(b). For congressional findings regarding the national and interna-
tional significance of Everglades National Park, as well as the adverse effects of
altered hydrologic conditions both within and outside of the park, see id. § 410r-5.
108. See Grand Canyon Protection Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-575, § 1802, 106 Stat.
4600, 4669-70 (discussed at Part III.B, infra); Cameron v. United States, 252
U.S. 450, 455-56 (1920) (citing President Theodore Roosevelt's proclamation that
the Grand Canyon "is an object of unusual scientific interest" and explaining that
the canyon is "the greatest eroded canyon in the United States, if not in the
world, is over a mile in depth, has attracted wide attention among explorers and
scientists, affords an unexampled field for geologic study, is regarded as one of
the great natural wonders, and annually draws to its borders thousands of
visitors").
109. See William J. Lockhart, External Threats to our National Parks: An Argument
for Substantive Protection, 16 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 3 (1997) (discussing the inade-
quacy of legal authorities for protecting parks from external threats). The MSY
concept is discussed supra Part II.B.1.
110. CARL WALTERS, ADAPTIVE MANAGEMENT OF RENEWABLE RESOURCES (1986); see A.
Dan Tarlock, Slouching Toward Eden: The Eco-Pragmatic Challenges of Ecosys-
tem Revival, 87 MINN. L. REV. 1173, 1197 (2003) (describing origins of adaptive
management).
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little by way of guidance from lawmakers. In United States federal
and state law, "[flew statutes mention adaptive management and even
fewer require it."' Even so, no other scientific principle "has so
deeply permeated the practice on the basis of so little mention in the
law."112
There is no generally applicable national legislation that requires
adaptive ecosystem management. However, several departments and
agencies have adopted administrative provisions related to adaptive
management. The regulatory definition of adaptive management in
wetlands regulation of the Corps of Engineers provides as follows:
Adaptive management means the development of a management strategy
that anticipates likely challenges associated with compensatory mitigation
projects and provides for the implementation of actions to address those chal-
lenges, as well as unforeseen changes to those projects. It requires considera-
tion of the risk, uncertainty, and dynamic nature of compensatory mitigation
projects and guides modification of those projects to optimize performance. It
includes the selection of appropriate measures that will ensure that the
aquatic resource functions are provided and involves analysis of monitoring
results to identify potential problems of a compensatory mitigation project
and the identification and implementation of measures to rectify those
problems.1 1 3
More specifically, the Corps's regulations for implementing the
Everglades Plan call for adaptive management as a process for under-
standing the ecosystem and trying to improve the plan in response to
new information.14 Adaptive management is seen as a strategy to
deal with uncertainty and "substantially improve the chance of suc-
cess in achieving ecosystem goals."x 15
The Department of Interior's definition of adaptive management
can be found in a Departmental Manual, which describes the concept
as "a system of management practices based on clearly identified out-
comes, monitoring to determine if management actions are meeting
outcomes, and, if not, facilitating management changes that will best
ensure that outcomes are met or to re-evaluate the outcomes."116 The
111. J.B. Ruhl, Adaptive Management for Natural Resources-Inevitable, Impossible,
or Both?, in 54TH ANNUAL RocKY MOUNTAIN MINERAL LAW INSTITUTE 11-1, 11-1
(2008).
112. Id.
113. 33 C.F.R. § 332.2 (2008).
114. Id. § 385.3.
115. COMPREHENSIVE EVERGLADES RESTORATION PLAN, COMPREHENSIVE EVERGLADES
RESTORATION PLAN ADAPTIVE MANAGEMENT STRATEGY 1 (2006), available at http:/
/www.evergladesplan.org/pm/recover/recover-docs/am/rec am stategy-brochure.
pdf.
116. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, 516 DEPARTMENTAL MANUAL 4.16 (2005). Adaptive man-
agement provisions for fulfilling obligations under the National Environmental
Policy Act were promulgated as a final rule in October 2008. Implementation of
the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) of 1969, 73 Fed. Reg. 61,314 (Oct.
15, 2008) (codified at 43 C.F.R. pt. 46). A similar definition is found at 43 C.F.R.
§ 46.30 (2008).
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Department has embraced adaptive management as an appropriate
method of management in cases "where long-term impacts may be un-
certain."117 Interior agencies have committed themselves to, "[w]here
feasible, implement adaptive management (AM) procedures into the
NEPA planning and implementation processes."118 In addition, in at
least one of its listing decisions, the Fish and Wildlife Service has
identified adaptive management as a feedback loop in the form of six
specific steps: "assessment, design of management actions and associ-
ated monitoring and research, implementation of management accord-
ing to the design, monitoring, evaluation of outcomes, and adjustment
of management based on evaluation of initial management
actions."119
Despite the agencies' willingness to consider adaptive management
as a viable restoration tool, as noted above, very little by way of legally
enforceable mandates to engage in adaptive management can be
found in the regulations, much less in federal legislation. As a result,
citizens that attempt to force agencies to undertake discretionary
practices such as to monitor and incorporate new data into adaptive
management practices may encounter virtually impenetrable judicial
roadblocks.120
III. CASE STUDIES: THE EVERGLADES AND THE GRAND
CANYON RESTORATION PROJECTS
The Florida Everglades and the Grand Canyon of the Colorado
River are iconic ecosystems that symbolize the American landscape
and, by extension, the spirit of the American people. 12 1 Both have
been designated as world heritage sites because of their remarkable
117. 43 C.F.R. § 46.145.
118. Id.; see also Bureau of Land Management, National Environmental Policy Act
Revised Implementing Procedures, 71 Fed. Reg. 4159, 4163 (Jan. 25, 2006).
119. Final Rule Designating the Greater Yellowstone Area Population of Grizzly
Bears as a Distinct Population Segment, 72 Fed. Reg. 14,866, 14,869 (March 29,
2007) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17).
120. See Norton v. S. Utah Wilderness Alliance, 542 U.S. 55, 62-66 (2004) (rejecting
claims that the Bureau of Land Management should take action to prevent dam-
age to public lands caused by off road vehicle use and evidencing great deference
to agency resource allocation decisions); Benzman v. Whitman, 523 F.3d 119, 131
(2d Cir. 2008) (dismissing an action by citizens who alleged that the EPA should
have warned them about risks of exposure to dust released when the World Trade
Center collapsed because no regulation required the EPA to take discrete action);
Fund for Animals, Inc. v. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 460 F.3d 13, 21-22 (D.C. Cir.
2006) (dismissing claims related to the bureau's budget request, which set broad
goals and strategies for its wild horses and burros program, as a non-binding,
non-reviewable strategy).
121. Gunderson & Light, supra note 22, at 324.
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biological, geological, and cultural features. 12 2 But a closer look be-
yond their extraordinary features reveals two highly managed social-
ecological systems. Management goals have historically centered on
providing water supplies to urban populations and agriculture and on
protecting riparian residents from flooding. By the late twentieth cen-
tury, ecological crises provoked by historic management practices
posed a serious threat to biological, social, and cultural values. As a
result, a political window of opportunity opened, which in turn stimu-
lated federal and state legislative and administrative responses.
In both cases, Congress passed special legislation requiring certain
restoration activities in the Everglades and in the Grand Canyon
(below Glen Canyon dam). The legislation in both cases compels col-
laborative decision-making through multilateral stakeholder partici-
pation. 123 Restoration plans are driven not only by this special
legislation, but also by the generally applicable national legislation
described above, 124 which prohibits unregulated discharges of water
pollutants and jeopardy to federally listed species and which man-
dates procedural safeguards through regular administrative
processes. 125 The stakes are extremely high in both cases. The conse-
quences of failure may put in jeopardy billions of dollars, critical water
supplies, and dozens of wildlife and plant species.
A. The Everglades: Physical Condition and Legislative
Framework
The South Florida Everglades was once comprised of about 3 mil-
lion acres (4,000 square miles) of slow-moving water, wetlands, saw-
grass, islands and hammocks of tropical hardwoods, dry prairies,
limestone outcroppings, and a vast array of unique wildlife, fish, and
bird species. 12 6 Today, the Everglades is about half of its original size
122. Both parks were designated as world heritage sites in 1979. See United Nations
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, World Heritage List, http://
whc.unesco.org/en/list/75 (last visited Dec. 28, 2008); United Nations Educa-
tional, Scientific and Cultural Organization, World Heritage List, http://
whc.unesco.org/enlist/76 (last visited Dec. 28, 2008); cf. FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 373.4592(1)(a) (West 2005 & Supp. 2009) (proclaiming that the Everglades is
irreplaceable and "is unique in the world and one of Florida's greatest
treasures").
123. See Grand Canyon Protection Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-575, § 1807, 106 Stat.
4600, 4672; Water Resources Development Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-303,
§ 528(f), 110 Stat. 3658, 3770-73.
124. See supra Part IL.B (describing, inter alia, the Clean Water Act and the Endan-
gered Species Act).
125. See, e.g., Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 553, 706 (2006); National En-
vironmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C) (2000).
126. COMM. ON RESTORATION OF THE GREATER EVERGLADES ECOSYSTEM, NAT'L RE-
SEARCH COUNCIL, RE-ENGINEERING WATER STORAGE IN THE EVERGLADES: RISKS
AND OPPORTUNITIES 1 (2005); Deborah M. Hussey Freeland, Maieusis Through a
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due to human settlements and the flood-control structures constructed
to maintain those settlements.127 Flow alterations and pollution from
urban and agricultural sources have transformed the region's vast
"rivers of grass" into "isolated islands of degraded wetlands trapped
between farms and housing developments."128
By the late 1980s, wetlands loss, declining populations of species,
and widespread nutrient contamination were attracting national at-
tention. 129 An $8 billion federal-state plan to re-plumb southern Flor-
ida and restore the Everglades, known as the Comprehensive
Everglades Restoration Plan ("CERP" or the "Plan"),130 was adopted
in 2000. It is considered the "flagship" of ecological restoration plans
and it is being emulated throughout the country and in numerous
other countries.131 The goal of the Plan is "getting the water
right,"13 2 which entails capturing one trillion gallons of rainwater,
storing it in reservoirs and injection wells, and then distributing it to
farms, residents, and the Everglades National Park in the right
amounts at the right times.133 As described below, the Plan is cur-
rently in the throes of implementation, with nearly a decade-long
track record in place. The legacies of the past, in terms of preexisting
Gated Membrane: "Getting the Science Right" in Public Decisionmaking, 26 STAN.
ENVTL. L.J. 373, 403 (2007).
127. COMM. ON RESTORATION OF THE GREATER EVERGLADES ECOSYSTEM, supra note
126, at 1.
128. ANDREEN & JONES, supra note 93, at 43 (citing Andrea K. Gerlak & Tanya Heik-
kila, Comparing Collaborative Mechanisms in Large-Scale Ecosystem Govern-
ance, 46 NAT. RESOURCES J. 657, 665 (2006)).
129. Tanya Heikkila & Andrea K. Gerlak, The Formation of Large-scale Collaborative
Resource Management Institutions: Clarifying the Roles of Stakeholders, Science,
and Institutions, 33 POL'Y STUD. J. 583, 596 (2005).
130. Water Resources Development Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-541, § 601, 114 Stat.
2572, 2680; see Mary Doyle, Implementing Everglades Restoration, 17 J. LAND
USE & ENVTL. L. 59 (2001); Mary Doyle & Donald E. Jodrey, Everglades Restora-
tion: Forging New Law in Allocating Water for the Environment, 8 ENVTL. LAW.
255, 276-81 (2002).
131. Gunderson & Light, supra note 22, at 332.
132. U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG'RS, JACKSONVILLE DIST., & So. FLA. WATER MGMT. DIST.,
CENTRAL AND SOUTHERN FLORIDA COMPREHENSIVE REVIEW STUDY FINAL INTE-
GRATED FEASIBILITY REPORT AND PROGRAMMATIC ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATE-
MENT: INTRODUCTION 1-3 (1999), available at http://www.evergladesplan.org/docs/
comp-plan-apr99/sectl.pdf [hereinafter RESTUDY: INTRODUCTION]. The Corps of
Engineers and the South Florida Water Management District, which co-sponsor
the Plan, maintain an official website at http://www.evergladesplan.org. The
Plan includes various sections, with each one available at a separate internet
site. To avoid cumbersome and confusing citations, these sections refer generally
to RESTUDY and then provide a specific section and internet citation. Links for all
sections are available at http://www.evergladesplan.org/pub/restudy-eis.aspx#
mainreport.
133. Michael Grunwald, A Rescue Plan, Bold and Uncertain: Scientists, Federal Offi-
cials Question Project's Benefits for Ailing Ecosystem, WASH. POST, June 23, 2002,
at A01 [hereinafter Grunwald, Rescue Plan].
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and in some cases intractable expectations, infrastructure, laws, and
policies, have proved a significant obstacle to restoration.
1. The C&SFP Canals and the Federal Restoration Plans
After the tropical storms of 1947 inundated ninety percent of
southeastern Florida,134 Congress authorized construction of the Cen-
tral and Southern Florida Project ("C&SF Project") "for flood control
and other purposes."13 5 Pursuant to the C&SF Project, the Corps con-
structed three water conservation areas to serve as reservoirs and to
mitigate saltwater intrusion into the freshwater supplies for east-
coast communities and agriculture. Although the conservation areas
were also intended to benefit fish and wildlife species, 13 6 the C&SF
Project prioritized flood control.137 Congress lauded the C&SF Project
as "an excellent example of the coordination of improvements for flood
control, water control, and related purposes with requirements for
preservation of fish and wildlife."138 As such, Congress believed that
we could have it all-the C&SF Project would "restore the natural bal-
ance between soil and water," thereby sustaining human life as well
as wildlife. 13 9
The C&SF Project ultimately became a colossal plumbing system
that extends over 18,000 square miles from Orlando to the Florida
Keys. It is comprised of 1,000 miles of canals, 720 miles of levees, 16
pumping stations, and various other impoundments, structures, and
operations designed to move freshwater to the sea in order to main-
tain drainage for agriculture and urban growth. 140 As a result, water
levels are lower and annual flows have decreased, some lands within
the Plan area became drier while others were flooded, habitats have
been relocated or destroyed, and salinity levels have been altered.141
The engineered compartmentalization and drainage of the Everglades
caused severe losses in ecosystem area and water storage capacity, as
well as increased water pollution and invasion by opportunistic exotic
134. H.R. Doc. No. 80-643, at 47 (1948); RESTUDY: INTRODUCTION, supra note 132, at
1-25.
135. Flood Control Act of 1948, Pub. L. No. 858, § 203, 62 Stat. 1175, 1176.
136. H.R. Doc. No. 80-643, at 42-43.
137. Hussey Freeland, supra note 126, at 413-14. Congress deemed "[o]verdrainage of
certain lands" as "a serious problem which must be rectified." H.R. Doc. No. 80-
643, at 34.
138. H.R. Doc. No. 80-643, at 56.
139. Id. at 33.
140. Programmatic Regulations for the Comprehensive Everglades Restoration Plan,
68 Fed. Reg. 64,200 (Nov. 12, 2003) (to be codified at 33 C.F.R. pt. 385); RESTUDY:
UPDATE AND BACKGROUND FACT SHEET, available at http://www.evergladesplan.
org/docs/backgd.pdf.
141. Hussey Freeland, supra note 126, at 414.
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species that thrive under altered conditions. 142 The declines in envi-
ronmental conditions have been ascribed to changes in the amount of
water that moves through the managed system and to changes in
water quality, primarily an increase in the amount of phosphorous. 143
Even before the C&SF Project was completed, problems began to
emerge. In the 1960s, following a drought, Everglades National Park
officials were concerned that the project would not deliver sufficient
water to the park. This led to Public Law 91-282, which in 1970 guar-
anteed the park a minimum amount of water.144 A decadal pattern
followed in which the same amount of water was delivered each year,
regardless of rainfall conditions.14 5
It was not long before environmental groups sued the Florida De-
partment of Environmental Resources for failing to require the South
Florida Water Management District ("SFWMD") to get a CWA permit
for its operation of C&SF structures that discharged pollutants into
Lake Okeechobee.146 To mitigate the pollution problem, a Technical
Advisory Council to the governor of Florida recommended a nutrient-
removal program along with various measures to reduce phos-
phorus. 14 7 Even so, litigation against the State of Florida prolifer-
ated, resulting in both judicial decrees and settlement agreements
intended to control pollution and improve the condition of the
Everglades.148
142. RESTUDY: PROBLEMS AND OPPORTUNITIES 5-4, available at http://www.everglades
plan.org/docs/comp-plan-apr99/sect5.pdf.
143. RESTUDY: SUMMARY, at iii, available at http://www.evergladesplan.org/docs/comp-
plan-apr99/summary.pdf.
144. Stephen S. Light & Walter Dineen, Water Control in the Everglades, a Historical
Perspective, in EVERGLADES: THE ECOSYSTEM AND ITS RESTORATION 66 (Steven M.
Davis & John C. Ogden eds., 1994).
145. Id.
146. See Friends of the Everglades, Inc. v. S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist., No. 02-80309,
2006 WL 3635465, at *22-23 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 11, 2006) (describing the 1970s
litigation).
147. Stephen S. Light et al., The Everglades: Evolution of Management in a Turbulent
Environment, in BARRIERS AND BRIDGES TO THE RENEWAL OF ECOSYSTEMS AND IN-
STITUTIONS 144 (Lance H. Gunderson et al. eds., 1995).
148. See S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, 541 U.S. 95, 112
(2004) (remanding the tribe's lawsuit to force the district to obtain a Clean Water
Act permit for discharges from the C-11 Canal into Lake Okeechobee); United
States v. S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist., 847 F. Supp. 1567 (S.D. Fla. 1992), affd in
part, 28 F.3d 1563 (11th Cir. 1994) (approving the settlement of a federal enforce-
ment action to redress SWFMD's movement of polluted water to Everglades Na-
tional Park and the Loxahatchee National Wildlife Refuge); Miccosukee Tribe of
Indians v. United States, No. 04-21448-CIV, 2008 WL 2967654 (S.D. Fla. July 29,
2008) (granting partial summary judgment against the EPA, setting aside the
EPA's approval of Florida's water quality standards and enjoining the Florida
Department of Environmental Protection from issuing permits for phosphorous
discharges in the Everglades Protection Area); Friends of the Everglades, Inc. v.
S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist., No. 02-80309, 2006 WL 3635465, at *22-23 (S.D. Fla.
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Both the state and federal governments have continued to attempt
to resolve the underlying water quality problems. In addition, con-
cerns that tightly regulated deliveries were causing more harm than
good to park resources, coupled with a flood in 1983, prompted Con-
gress to relieve the constraints of Public Law 91-282 by authorizing a
more flexible, iterative program that would allow managers to learn
how to better manage water levels.149 Meanwhile, the governor of
Florida launched the "Save our Everglades" program, which consisted
of a series of steps, including the formation of a collaborative effort
called the Everglades Coalition.15o
Beginning in 1988, a group of scientists, led by C.S. Holling, Carl
Walters, Steve Davis, and Lance Gunderson, came together to synthe-
size understanding of the Everglades ecosystem-how it had changed
and whether anything could be done to reverse the declines attributed
to the C&SF project. There was a sense in the scientific community
that decades of research had not resulted in any improvement in the
ecosystem. As part of that effort, a series of adaptive environmental
assessment workshops (the first phases of adaptive management)
were held. The results of those workshops indicated that restoration
of remaining parts of the Everglades was possible because there was
sufficient water in the system to experiment, but that water required
cleaning because the sources of water had been severely degraded. 15 1
That understanding laid the scientific framework for ecosystem resto-
ration, which was carried forth by federal and state governments
through separate planning efforts that focused on a review of the
C&SF plan.
Building on these efforts, Congress authorized the South Florida
Ecosystem Restoration Task Force in 1996,152 and directed the Corps
of Engineers to develop "a proposed comprehensive plan for the pur-
Dec. 11, 2006) (describing an environmental groups' lawsuit to force SFWMD to
obtain a CWA permit for discharges from various C&SF pumping stations into
Lake Okeechobee). For an assesesment of the CWA litigation, see infra notes
275-86 and accompanying text.
149. River Basin Monetary Authorization and Miscellaneous Civil Works Amend-
ments Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-282, 84 Stat. 310.
150. Thomas T. Ankersen & Richard Hamann, Ecosystem Management and the Ever-
glades: A Legal and Institutional Analysis, 11 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 473, 528
n.357 (1996). The program was initiated by Governor Bob Graham in 1983 and
continued through the administrations of subsequent governors Bob Martinez
and Lawton Chiles. Id.
151. C.S. Holling et al., The Structure and Dynamics of the Everglades System: Guide-
lines for Ecosystem Restoration, in EVERGLADES: THE ECOSYSTEM AND ITS RESTO-
RATION 754-55 (Steven M. Davis & John C. Ogden eds., 1994).
152. See South Florida Ecosystem Restoration Task Force, Task Force Information
Page, http://www.sfrestore.org/tf/index.html (last visited Jan. 13, 2009) (citing




pose of restoring, preserving, and protecting the South Florida ecosys-
tem."153 As a result, the Corps conducted the Central and Southern
Florida Comprehensive Review Study ("Restudy"), which concluded
that (1) the Everglades had lost half of its geographic area and seventy
percent of its input flows, (2) water quality had deteriorated, largely
due to excessive phosphorus, (3) at least sixty-eight of the Everglades'
species had become endangered and habitats were still being lost, and
(4) exotic species had invaded much of the Everglades, significantly
altering the ecosystem. 154
The Restudy acknowledged that much of the degradation in the
Everglades is a direct result of the C&SF Flood Control Project,155
and recommended the Comprehensive Everglades Restoration Plan in
hopes of reversing adverse trends by making operational changes to
the C&SF Project in order to restore the quantity, quality, timing, and
distribution of water. 156 That Plan, described below, was adopted by
Congress in the Water Resources Development Act of 2000 ("WRDA
2000"). 157 By adopting the Plan, Congress intended to provide the
necessary changes "to restore, preserve, and protect the South Florida
ecosystem while providing for other water-related needs of the region,
including water supply and flood protection."' 5 8 The $8 billion cost of
Everglades restoration is to be shared equally by the federal govern-
ment and the non-federal sponsor, the SFWMD.159
The water management components of the Plan are replete with
engineered devices-levees, canals, pumps, and their removal. The
Plan includes over 60 individual components, including the creation of
217,000 acres of water storage and treatment areas and the removal
of 240 miles of levees and canals.16 0 Roughly eighty percent of the 1.1
million acre-feet of water per year to be generated by these activities
is allocated to ecosystem recovery.161
Implementation of restoration projects has been exceedingly slow.
A handful of pilot projects for water storage and reuse, designed to
test some of the new technology, were authorized for immediate imple-
153. Water Resources Development Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-303, § 528(b)(1)(A)(i),
110 Stat. 3658, 3767.
154. RESTUDY: KEY POINTS FACT SHEET, available at http://www.evergladesplan.org/
docs/key.pdf.
155. RESTUDY: EXISTING CONDITIONS 3-1, available at http://www.evergladesplan.org/
docs/comp-plan-apr99/sect3.pdf.
156. RESTUDY: UPDATE AND BACKGROUND, supra note 140.
157. Water Resources Development Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-541, § 601(b)(1)(A),
114 Stat. 2572, 2681 [hereinafter WRDA 20001.
158. Id.
159. Id. § 601(c)(3).
160. Programmatic Regulations for the Comprehensive Everglades Restoration Plan,
68 Fed. Reg. 64,200, 64,200 (Nov. 12, 2003) (to be codified at 33 C.F.R. pt. 385).
161. RESTUDY: FACTS AND STATISTICS, available at http://www.evergladesplan.org/docs/
facts.pdf.
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mentation, but nearly a dozen others, including the Adaptive Assess-
ment and Monitoring Program described below, were authorized
subject to certain conditions, including the submission and approval of
individual project implementation reports. 162 Actual construction of
even the pilot projects was not scheduled to begin until 2003 or 2004,
and the other projects were expected to wait a year or two after
that.163
Adaptive management is to be accomplished through two primary
mechanisms. First, Congress authorized a $100 million Adaptive As-
sessment and Monitoring Program for the first ten years of implemen-
tation.164 In addition, it directed an independent scientific review
panel to assess the Plan's progress in restoring the ecosystem and to
report its findings to Congress every other year.165 The Corps's
Programmatic Regulations implementing WRDA 2000 acknowledge
that "independent scientific review is crucial for ensuring that the
best available science is used" in restoration. 16 6
WRDA 2000 included an institutional mechanism for integrating
"new information resulting from changed or unforeseen circum-
stances, [or] new scientific or technical information" into the Plan dur-
ing implementation.167 Specifically, programmatic regulations must
be reviewed at least every five years in order to assimilate new infor-
mation into Plan administration.168 Thus, the Programmatic Regula-
tions are considered "a central component in the adaptive assessment
and management process on which success of the Plan
depends."16 9
The regulations also establish procedures for setting interim goals,
or benchmarks, in evaluating the effectiveness of restoration efforts
during Plan implementation.170 Benchmarks are to include water
quantity, quality, and timing and desired ecosystem responses. They
162. WRDA 2000 § 601(b)(2)(C)-(D); infra notes 164-71.
163. Phyllis McIntosh, Reviving the Everglades, NAT'L PARKS, Jan. 1, 2002, at 30,
available at http://www.npca.org/magazine/2002/january-february/everglades.
164. WRDA 2000 § 601(b)(2)(C)(xi).
165. Id. The Panel was assembled by the National Academy of Sciences and produced
its first report in 2006. See COMM. ON INDEP. SCIENTIFIC REVIEW OF EVERGLADES
RESTORATION PROGRESS, NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, PROGRESS TOWARD RESTORING
THE EVERGLADES: THE FIRST BIENNIAL REVIEW (2006); National Academies, Cur-
rent Projects System: Independent Scientific Review of Everglades Restoration
Projects 2004-07 (2007), http://wwwS.nationalacademies.org/cp/projectview.?key=
WSTB-U-03-04-A (last visited Jan. 13, 2009).
166. Programmatic Regulations for the Comprehensive Everglades Restoration Plan,
68 Fed. Reg. 64,200, 64,206 (Nov. 12, 2003) (codified at 33 C.F.R. pt. 385); see also
33 C.F.R. § 385.22(a) (2008) (creating an independent review panel).
167. WRDA 2000 § 601(h)(3)(C)(i)(II).
168. Id. § 601(h)(3)(E).
169. Hussey Freeland, supra note 126, at 423 (citing S. REP. No. 106-362, at 56
(2000)).
170. 33 C.F.R. §§ 385.6, 385.38; see WRDA 2000 § 601(h)(3)(E).
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are to be revised at least every five years if new information suggests
that revisions are needed.171
Beyond engineered solutions and federal regulations, Everglades
restoration has also required certain adaptations in Florida water
law. As the result of a federal-state agreement required by WRDA
2000, the state of Florida must conduct its water use permitting pro-
cess in a manner that precludes water arising from a Plan project
from being allocated or "otherwise made unavailable" by the state un-
til a sufficient amount is first reserved for ecosystem restoration.172 A
proviso in WRDA 2000 has the potential to erode the efficacy of this
requirement, however, by protecting the existing water allocation re-
gime created under Florida state law.173 "Existing legal sources of
water" are shielded by a clause that prohibits depletion by any modifi-
cations in the C&SF Project until alternative water sources are availa-
ble.174 In addition, "existing, legally recognized rights to flood
protection" must be honored.175 The Corps has struggled to define
and identify just what activities or sources of water are considered
"legally recognized" and therefore protected by WRDA.176 This deter-
mination will turn on Florida state water law, described below.177
Threats to the species of the Everglades were addressed through a
parallel track under the auspices of the ESA.178 While the CERP was
being formulated during the late 1990s, the Fish and Wildlife Service
approved the South Florida Multi-Species Recovery Plan in an effort
to mitigate threats to federally listed animal and plant species.179
The Multi-Species Plan covers 26,000 square miles (67,000 kilome-
ters) and includes specific recovery objectives for sixty-eight listed spe-
171. Hussey Freeland, supra note 126, at 424 (citing 33 C.F.R. § 385.38(b)(2)-(3),(b)(5)(i)).
172. WRDA 2000 § 601(h)(2); John T. Woolley & Gerhard Peters, The Am. Presidency
Project, Comprehensive Everglades Restoration Plan Assurance of Project Bene-
fits Agreement, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=73225&st=
&stl (last visited Jan. 13, 2009) (providing the text of the agreement).
173. Hussey Freeland, supra note 126, at 420.
174. WRDA 2000 § 601(h)(2)(B)(i).
175. Id. § 601(h)(5)(B); S. REP. No. 106-362, at 57 (2000).
176. 33 C.F.R. §§ 385.36(a) (requiring Project Implementation Reports to include anal-
yses regarding whether existing legal sources would be eliminated or trans-
ferred), 385.5(a)(2)(vi) (2008) (directing the development of guidance for
determining whether an existing legal source of water will be eliminated or
transferred as a result of Plan implementation). The Corps's regulations provide
that, "[u]ntil guidance is issued, issues involving existing legal sources of water
should be resolved on a case-by-case basis considering all [relevant] factors." Id.
§ 385.36(c).
177. See infra Part III.A.2.
178. See supra Part II.B.3.
179. U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., SOUTH FLORIDA MULTI-SPECIES RECOVERY PLAN
(1999), available at http://www.fws.gov/verobeach/images/pdfLibrary/execsum.
pdf.
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cies, such as minimum numbers of individuals and of populations, as
well as large-scale community level restoration objectives, including
habitat conservation and restoration of ecological linkages.1SO Limit-
ing factors for the viability of all species covered in the plan include
"upland and wetland habitat loss, fragmentation, and degradation, re-
sulting from urbanization, agriculture or other land-use conversions,
wetland drainage and alteration of hydrology, invasion of exotic spe-
cies, fire suppression, soil subsidence, degradation of water quality,
and increased levels of contaminants."181 The FWS concluded that
one-fourth of the species covered by the Multi-Species Plan "are de-
pendent upon implementation of the CERP for survival and recovery,
and many others will benefit significantly as a result of this restora-
tion effort."18 2 If all goes as planned, the agency anticipates that, in
the next two decades of implementation, over a dozen species will be
removed from the endangered species list.183
The CERP and the Multi-Species Plan have committed Everglades
managers to adaptive management principles, but the jury is still out
on restoration accomplishments.18 4 There are two primary criticisms,
which we explore in detail below.18 5 First, the CERP devotes too
much attention to the use of ever more heroic engineering techniques
to expand water supplies and ensure flood control for South Florida's
exploding population. In addition, both the CERP and the Multi-Spe-
cies Plan give low priority to the improvement of necessary sheet
water flows to the Everglades, and too much emphasis to maintaining
stakeholders' economic interests, which place a chokehold on experi-
mentation, learning, and adaptation.18 6 As a result, the CERP re-
mains in a planning mode. Nearly a decade after the enabling law
was passed, there has been much discussion in the scientific, manage-
ment, and legal community about what project should be pursued. In
a 2007 review, however, the Government Accountability Office ob-
served that no CERP projects had been completed and that the only
progress was attributed to a few, select CERP-related projects. 18 7
These related projects are mostly pilot programs to understand nutri-
ent removal in abandoned agricultural fields that have become wet-
180. Id. at ix-x.
181. Id. at ix.
182. Id. at xi.
183. Everglades: Multiple Species Recovery Project Announced as Part of Restoration
Effort, [1999 File Index] 30 Env't Rep. (BNA), No. 4, at 178 (May 28, 1999).
184. Michael Voss, The Central and Southern Florida Project Comprehensive Review
Study: Restoring the Everglades, 27 ECOLOGY L.Q. 751, 761-62 (2000).
185. See infra Part IV.A.2.
186. Grunwald, Rescue Plan, supra note 133, at A01.
187. U.S. GOVT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, SOUTH FLORIDA ECOSYSTEM: RESTORATION IS
MOVING FORWARD BUT Is FACING SIGNIFICANT DELAYS, IMPLEMENTATION CHAL-




lands. While adaptive management experiments were designed as
early as 1993, there have yet to be any such experiments conducted in
the system.i8 8
2. Florida State Water Law
Everglades restoration is also influenced by Florida water law.
The Florida legislature adopted one of the nation's most comprehen-
sive water codes in 1972, with the goal of providing more certainty for
water users while retaining the flexibility to adjust water uses to re-
flect new conditions or changed priorities and to foster greater inte-
gration of planning and regulation to protect Florida's water
resources.' 8 9 The Florida Water Code authorizes certain "reasonable-
beneficial uses," defined as "the use of water in such quantity as is
necessary for economic and efficient utilization for a purpose and in a
manner which is both reasonable and consistent with the public inter-
est."' 90 The State Department of Environmental Protection ("DEP")
maintains oversight of the Act's implementation.191 The five regional
water management districts are also granted authority for managing
water resources within their watersheds, and this includes regulating
almost "any use of water that involves withdrawing or diverting it."192
Instream flows are protected by a statutory provision that directs
each water management district to establish "minimum flow for all
surface watercourses in the area," defined as "the limit at which fur-
ther withdrawals would be significantly harmful to the water re-
sources or ecology of the area."i 9 3 The DEP's Water Resource
Implementation Rule specifies that water management plans shall,
where economically and environmentally feasible, promote water sup-
ply but also protect natural systems in three key ways: (1) establish
minimum flow levels to protect water resources and the environmen-
tal values associated with marine, estuarine, freshwater, and wet-
lands ecology; (2) mitigate adverse impacts resulting from prior
alteration of natural hydrologic patterns; and (3) utilize natural water
188. Gunderson & Light, supra note 22, at 324.
189. Water Resources Act of 1972, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 373.013-.201 (West 2005) (pro-
viding the current version of the law, as amended).
190. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 373.019(16) (West 2005). In considering applications for con-
sumptive use of water, the District is required to determine "whether the use of
water is efficient, whether there is a need for the water requested, and whether
the use is for a legitimate purpose. The inquiry focuses on the impact of the use
on water resources and existing legal users." Marion County v. Greene, No.
5D07-1239, 2008 WL 2937828, at *3 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. Aug. 1, 2008).
191. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 373.026.
192. FLORIDA WATER RESOURCES ATLAS 306 (Edward A. Fernald & Elizabeth D.
Purdum eds.,1998); see FLA. STAT. ANN. § 373.069 (creating water management
districts).
193. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 373.042(1)(a).
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management systems rather than channelization or other physical al-
teration of natural rivers, streams, and lakes.19 4 The courts have
been willing to give these provisions "teeth." In response to litigation
brought by a citizens' group, which sought to compel a water manage-
ment district to establish minimum flows and to prevent it from issu-
ing additional consumptive permits until minimums were established,
a Florida court held that the Code requires water districts to establish
minimum flows and levels; it does not merely suggest that they do
SO. 195
In addition, the Water Code gives the districts and the DEP discre-
tion to reserve water from amounts sought in permit applications "in
such locations and quantities, and for such seasons of the year, as...
may be required for the protection of fish and wildlife or the public
health and safety."196 This provision has only rarely been utilized,
however, perhaps because the statute also provides that reservations
may not diminish existing permitted uses.197 This caveat, along with
the provision of WRDA that protects existing water uses, constrains
restoration options and makes the Florida system operate to some ex-
tent like prior appropriation systems of the Colorado River and the
rest of the western United States, where those who are first in time
(senior users) enjoy legally protected rights that take priority over the
needs of other users and, arguably, even the ecosystem itself.198
B. The Grand Canyon: Physical Condition and Legislative
Framework
As John Wesley Powell proclaimed over one hundred years ago,
"[t]he elements that unite to make the Grand Canyon the most sub-
194. FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r 62-40.310(4) (effective 2005).
195. Concerned Citizens of Putman County for Responsive Gov't, Inc. v. St. Johns
River Water Mgmt. Dist., 622 So. 2d 520 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
196. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 373.223(4) (West 2005 & Supp. 2009).
197. Id.; see Ass'n of Fla. Cmty. Developers v. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 943 So. 2d 989, 991
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006) (upholding Proposed Rule 60-40.474 specifying when
reservations may be made for the protection of fish and wildlife or for public
health and safety); Mary Jane Angelo, Integrating Water Management and Land
Use Planning: Uncovering the Missing Link in the Protection of Florida's Water
Resources?, 12 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL'y 223, 230 n.49 (2001) (citing FLA. ADMIN.
CODE ANN. r. 40C-2.301 and noting that, as of 2001, the reservation provision had
only been utilized once, when in 1994 the St. Johns River District reserved water
to protect the fish and wildlife of Paynes Prairie State Preserve near Gainesville).
198. See Christine A. Klein, On Integrity: Some Considerations For Water Law, 56
ALA. L. REV. 1009, 1051 (2005) (noting that provisions of Florida law that protect
existing uses are "incongruous with the riparian practice of granting water rights
in accordance with the public interest, rather than temporal priority"); infra
notes 347-49 (describing users' expectations under western water law).
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lime spectacle in nature are multifarious and exceedingly diverse."' 99
The Grand Canyon was created over the past 6 to 10 million years,
primarily by erosion as the Colorado River moved through the Colo-
rado plateau. It sits in the middle stretch of the Colorado River, a
section that begins downstream of the Glen Canyon dam and ends at
Lake Meade, the reservoir for the Hoover Dam. This stretch of river
flows through lands that are operated by the U.S. National Park Ser-
vice as the Glen Canyon National Recreation Area and the Grand
Canyon National Park. Tribal lands also border the river. 20 0
The last dam built on the Colorado River was the Glen Canyon
dam. This and other dams were constructed to control annual varia-
bility in water flow and to generate electricity. The dams provide
water storage and enable regulation of flows to meet the Law of the
River, which allocates water among seven states, and an international
treaty that guarantees delivery of water to Mexico. 2 0
After the dam was closed in 1962, the river ecosystem underwent a
regime shift. The river was historically characterized by extreme
floods, large sediment loads that colored the water red (hence the ori-
gin of the name, colorado, or "blushing," river), and seasonally large
fluctuations in temperature. 20 2 Today, for hundreds of kilometers
downstream of Glen Canyon Dam, the altered system has relatively
stable flow, clearer water, and a near-constant temperature year-
round. These physical changes in turn have led to unforeseen ecosys-
tem shifts, such as the loss of seven species of native fish, the endan-
germent of four others, and a reduction of habitat diversity. 20 3
In 1992, Congress passed the Grand Canyon Protection Act. 20 4
The Act directs the Secretary of Interior to operate Glen Canyon Dam
"in such a manner as to protect, mitigate adverse impacts to, and im-
prove the values" of Grand Canyon National Park.20 5 Congress was
not writing on a blank slate when it took action in 1992; rather, it
passed the Act upon a backdrop of over a half-century of legislation
and litigation. In recognition of the extant legal framework, Congress
directed the Secretary to perform the duties of the Grand Canyon Pro-
199. JOHN WESLEY POWELL, CANYONS OF THE COLORADO 394 (Argosy-Antiquarian,
Ltd. 1964) (1895).
200. These facts and others about the Grand Canyon can be found online. National
Park Service, Grand Canyon: Frequently Asked Questions, http://www.nps.gov/
grca/faqs.htm (last visited Jan. 13, 2009). Facts about the Glen Canyon restora-
tion plan are also available online. Glen Canyon Institute, Frequently Asked
Questions About Restoring Glen Canyon, http://www.glencanyon.org/aboutgci/
faq.php (last visited Jan. 13, 2009).
201. See infra note 208.
202. Hughes et al., supra note 14, at 589.
203. Id.
204. Grand Canyon Protection Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-575, §§ 1801-1809, 106
Stat. 4600, 4669-73 [hereinafter GCPA 1992].
205. Id. § 1802(a).
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tection Act "in a manner fully consistent with and subject to" the Law
of the River.20 6 Complicating matters further, the Act also specifies
that nothing in it "is intended to affect in any way-(1) the allocations
of water secured to the Colorado Basin States by any compact, law, or
decree; or (2) any Federal environmental law, including the Endan-
gered Species Act."2 0 7
The Law of the River-the 1922 Colorado River Compact and sub-
sequent amendments and judicial decrees 2O8-governs the activities
of the federal agencies that manage the Colorado River, as well as
those of the seven states, numerous Indian tribes, and private parties
that use its waters. 20 9 The Compact allocated the river's water be-
tween the four states of the upper Colorado River Basin and the three
states of the lower Basin, while judicial decrees and other facets of the
Law of the River, including the doctrine of prior appropriation as ap-
plied within each of the Basin states, prioritize those water rights.210
The Colorado River Project Act of 1956211 authorized the construc-
tion and operation of the Glen Canyon Dam, primarily to store water
for use by the upper Basin or for delivery to the lower Basin. 212 Con-
gress specified that, in addition to satisfying water rights, the Dam
was to provide hydroelectric power as a secondary purpose. 2 13 Today,
Glen Canyon Dam operates at less than its design capacity and pro-
206. Id. § 1802(b).
207. Id. § 1806.
208. The Law of the River consists of international treaties, interstate compacts, fed-
eral statutes and regulations, judicial decisions, and contractual agreements. It
includes the Colorado River Storage Project Act of 1956, 43 U.S.C. §§ 620-620(o)
(2000); the Colorado River Basin Project Act of 1968, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1501-1556; the
Act of April 6, 1949, ch. 48, 63 Stat. 31 (1949) (granting consent of the United
States to the Upper Colorado River Basin Compact of 1948); The Treaty on the
Utilization of Waters of the Colorado and Tijuana Rivers and of the Rio Grande,
U.S.-Mex., Feb. 3 1944, 59 Stat. 1219; and the Supreme Court's decrees in Ari-
zona v. California, 547 U.S. 150 (2006) and Arizona v. California, 376 U.S. 340
(1964).
209. JOSEPH L. SAX ET AL., LEGAL CONTROL OF WATER RESOURCES: CASES AND MATERI-
ALS 799 (4th ed. 2006).
210. 70 CONG. REC. 324 (1928) (providing the full text of the Compact). In particular,
article III(d) provided that "[t]he States of the Upper Division will not cause the
flow of the river at Lee Ferry to be depleted below an aggregate of 75,000,000
acre-feet for any period of ten consecutive years." Id. at 325; see also Arizona v.
California, 373 U.S. 546, 554 (1963) (explaining that the prior appropriation doc-
trine gives the one who first appropriates water and puts it to beneficial use a
right to continue to divert and use that quantity of water against all junior
users).
211. 43 U.S.C. §§ 620-620(o) (2000).
212. Robert W. Adler, Restoring the Environment and Restoring Democracy: Lessons
from the Colorado River, 25 VA. EvTL. L.J. 55, 80 (2007) [hereinafter Adler,
Lessons].
213. Id. at 80-81.
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vides only a very small percentage of the electricity on the western
power grid.214
Water supply and hydropower are not the only considerations for
Colorado River managers. In the past decade, numerous Colorado
River species have been listed as endangered or threatened. Of partic-
ular concern are four fish species: the Colorado pikeminnow; razor-
back sucker; humpback chub; and bonytail. As in the Everglades, the
Lower Colorado River is covered by a Multi-Species Conservation Pro-
gram.2 15 The Program's goal is relatively modest. It does not strive
for full species recovery, but merely to "conserve habitat and work to-
ward the recovery of threatened and endangered species."2 16 Indeed,
full recovery may well be impossible, given the explicit mandate in the
Program to "accommodate present water diversions and power pro-
duction and optimize opportunities for future water and power develop-
ment, to the extent consistent with the law."217 Moreover, during the
50-year life of the Program, if it turns out that additional measures
are needed to protect the species, the federal agencies are required to
"adopt those actions or measures that will have the least effect upon
the [plermittees and the respective constituents served by the
[pjermittees."2 18 The Program enabled the FWS to issue a single inci-
dental take permit to over forty different stakeholders in Arizona, Cal-
ifornia, and Nevada, including federal and state agencies, power
companies, irrigation districts, and cities. 2 19 Under the controversial
"No Surprises" rule, this permit prohibits the FWS from imposing the
costs of any additional restrictions on the use of land, water, or natu-
ral resources to protect the listed species on the permittees.2 2o
To effectuate its goals of protecting Grand Canyon Park and the
endangered fish species, while satisfying the Law of the River and pro-
viding hydropower, the Grand Canyon Protection Act of 1992 specifies
214. Glen Canyon Institute, supra note 200. Although its capacity is 1,320 mega-
watts, enough to serve 1.3 million residential customers, on average, Glen Can-
yon Dam generates only 451 megawatts, serving the needs of over half a million
customers, compared to Hoover Dam, which generates 1,840 average megawatts.
See id.; Glen Canyon Dam Adaptive Mgmt. Program, Hydropower, http://www.
gcdamp.gov/keyresc/hydropower.html (last visited Jan. 13, 2009).
215. LOWER COLO. RIVER MULTI-SPECIES CONSERVATION PROGRAM, FINAL HABITAT
CONSERVATION PLAN: VOLUME II (2004), available at http://www.lcrmscp.gov/
publicationsNolumeIl.pdf.
216. Id. at 1-3.
217. Id. (emphasis added); see ADLER, TROUBLED SENSE, supra note 1, at 180 (describ-
ing weaknesses of the Program).
218. LOWER COLO. RIVER MULTI-SPECIES CONSERVATION PROGRAM, supra note 215, at
490 (emphasis added).
219. ADLER, TROUBLED SENSE, supra note 1, at 180.
220. LOWER COLO. RIVER MULTI-SPECIES CONSERVATION PROGRAM, supra note 215, at
490; see infra notes 302-07 and accompanying text (describing the No Surprises
rule).
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that management decisions must be guided by a collaborative process
that engages representatives of the various stakeholder groups.22 1 In
addition, the Secretary of Interior is directed to establish monitoring
programs "in consultation with" other federal agencies, the seven Col-
orado River states, American Indian tribes, environmental organiza-
tions, power providers, and recreation interests.2 2 2 To satisfy these
requirements, the Secretary established the Glen Canyon Dam Adap-
tive Management Program ("AMP"), which is comprised of a twenty-
five member federal advisory committee-the Adaptive Management
Work Group (AMWG)-and several scientific and technical advisory
committees. 22 3 Research needs are met in part by the Grand Canyon
Monitoring and Research Center, which is a "well-resourced, formal
information gathering and assessment apparatus ... charged with the
scientific monitoring and research of the Colorado River
ecosystem." 224
The establishment of the collaborative AMP is an experiment in
adaptive governance. Adaptive governance is a process by which sci-
ence, policy, and decision making interact in formal (legal and institu-
tional) structures and informal processes to break gridlock in the
management of natural resources. 22 5 Adaptive governance describes
the social, legal, and political structures that allow for the process of
adaptive management to be practiced. 22 6 But adaptive management
was never envisioned as a mechanism to resolve complex social uncer-
tainties, such as trying to resolve conflicts between power generation
and endangered species. In the case of the AMP, the Secretary
thought that perhaps these contestations of values could be resolved
or at least addressed in a situation where all parties (and their con-
comitant values) could agree on a set of experiments rather than at-
tempt to resolve conflicting value sets. Accordingly, the AMP
emphasizes "long-term monitoring and research protocols that seek
repeated monitoring and, if necessary, adjustment of regulatory re-
strictions to account for new information or changed circumstances
that arise during implementation."227
221. GCPA 1992 §§ 1803(b), 1804(c)(3).
222. Id. §§ 1803(b), 1804(c)(3), 1805(a), (c).
223. Id.; see infra Part IV.A.1 (describing the deliberative processes and challenges of
the AMWG). As a formal advisory group, the AMWG must conduct open meet-
ings and comply with other requirements of the Federal Advisory Committee Act,
5 U.S.C. App. 2 § 10 (2006).
224. Alejandro E. Camacho, Beyond Conjecture: Learning About Ecosystem Manage-
ment from the Glen Canyon Dam Experiment, 8 NEV. L.J. 942, 955 (2008) [herein-
after Camacho, Conjecture].
225. See generally RONALD D. BRUNNER ET AL., ADAPTIVE GOVERNANCE: INTEGRATING
SCIENCE, POLICY, AND DECISION MAKING (2005) (analyzing the adaptive govern-
ance aspect of programs developed to address natural resource issues).
226. Gunderson & Light, supra note 22, at 325.
227. Camacho, Conjecture, supra note 224, at 954.
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In the mid-1990s, the need for turbine upgrades to Glen Canyon
Dam provided the opportunity for a series of experimental flood re-
leases from the dam as part of the AMWG's efforts to learn more about
the downstream ecosystem and ostensibly guide future dam opera-
tions.2 28 After much study and deliberation, the AMWG has engaged
in two high flow experiments and another two significant test flows in
the past decade. 2 29 These experiments have been praised by many as
successful examples of exactly the kind of adaptive implementation
that is needed in natural resource management. 2 30 The AMWG is not
without its critics, however, and we address their arguments below. 23 1
IV. LESSONS LEARNED
Our analysis of the Everglades and Glen Canyon restoration ef-
forts reveals three broad observations: (1) adaptive governance and
consensus-based management are not the same thing, and the latter
can sabotage rather than promote restoration initiatives; (2) heavy re-
liance on engineered solutions increases the likelihood of failure; and
(3) a continuing commitment to adaptive management is critical in
achieving restoration success. In keeping with these observations, our
overarching take-away lesson is that restoration plans should focus on
restoring natural hydrological and biological processes by which eco-
systems maintain resilience.2 32 In other words, rather than seek to
recover discrete resources to prescribed levels-maximum water sup-
plies, optimal power output, and the like-and rather than freezing
conditions at some predetermined, socially desirable state, restoration
efforts should seek to restore natural processes.23 3 This approach has
two key virtues. First, the restoration of natural processes will re-
quire less ongoing, human management over the long run. At least
equally important, restoring natural processes will allow ecosystems
to evolve over time, just as they did before the occurrence of major
artificial disturbances.234
228. Id. at 956.
229. Adler, Lessons, supra note 212, at 100-01.
230. See, e.g., Holly Doremus, Adaptive Management, the Endangered Species Act, and
the Institutional Challenges of "New Age" Environmental Protection, 41 WASH-
BURN L.J. 50, 78-79 (2001) [hereinafter Doremus, New Age]; Vicky J. Meretsky et
al., Balancing Endangered Species and Ecosystems: A Case Study of Adaptive
Management in Grand Canyon, 25 ENVWL. MGMT. 579 (2000); Bernice Wuethrich,
Deliberate Flood Renews Habitat, 272 Sci. 344, 344-45 (1995).
231. See infra Part IV.A.1.
232. See ADLER, TROUBLED SENSE, supra note 1, at 241 (advocating restoration of eco-
logical processes on the Colorado River).
233. Id.
234. Id. at 243.
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A. Consensus-Based Management Can Obstruct Restoration
Progress
Adaptive governance entails flexibility to learn and to make
changes in response to lessons learned. By contrast, consensus-based
management requirements, which typically require managers to reach
consensus with a multitude of participants with competing interests,
thereby satisfying all (or at least most) stakeholders in a collaborative
management effort, often leads to sacrificing environmental needs.
Most ongoing restoration programs have an elemental, yet often un-
spoken, trait in common-"they seek to restore natural ecosystem
characteristics and functions while preserving the basic interests of
those who use the river for economic benefits."2 35 This forces restora-
tion managers to engage in a delicate, possibly futile, high wire act, as
they strive to preserve the "legal and political structure that doles out
the ... water and power values while minimizing the long-term envi-
ronmental impacts of that system."23 6
Consensus-based management does have its advantages, but it
should be used to complement not substitute for adaptive governance.
Participation in decision-making and on-the-ground management can
build both knowledge and trust among stakeholders. 2 37 In addition,
deliberation can lead to the shared understanding needed to prepare
for change, mobilize resources, and self-organize, thereby building ro-
bustness and adaptive capacity in the group or institution. 238
The governing rules of the Glen Canyon AMP dictate that consen-
sus (not a simple majority) of the working group is needed before a
recommendation can be made to the Secretary. This leads to restric-
tion and conservatism, both with respect to the experiments that are
proposed and the measures that are actually implemented.
Almost every existing or proposed restoration strategy has impacts on other
river uses and values, which trigger opposition from various user groups, de-
lays in implementing effective restoration methods, and sometimes complete
policy gridlock .... Where potentially effective solutions to one problem might
adversely affect other uses and values, the manner and extent to which we
have insisted on collaborative process and full consensus among interest
groups can do more to preserve the status quo than to promote effective, inno-
vative solutions.
2 3 9
Yet somehow the AMP program has managed to identify a set of
ecologically based management goals and objectives, and it has con-
ducted several important adaptive experiments involving both water
235. Id. at 14.
236. Id.
237. Per Olsson et al., Shooting the Rapids: Navigating Transitions to Adaptive Gov-
ernance of Social-Ecological Systems, 11 ECOLOGY & Soc'Y 18, 4-6 (2006), availa-
ble at http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/volll/issl/artl8/.
238. Anderies et al., supra note 31, at 5.
239. ADLER, TROUBLED SENSE, supra note 1, at 268.
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releases and predator control.240 In contrast, in the Everglades, there
is little or no evidence of any trust or spirit of collaboration. Rather it
appears to be the opposite-an atmosphere of distrust and unyielding
adherence to individual or agency agendas. We attempt to parse
through the lessons of each to determine why the Glen Canyon AMP
has made progress while the Everglades CERP has not.
1. Adaptive Management on the Grand Canyon
The emphasis on scientific information gathering provided by the
Glen Canyon AMP is considered "particularly robust as compared to
other regulatory programs."2 41 The scientific institutions and re-
searchers at work in the Grand Canyon "are very capable of studying
any scientific or technical questions that the AMWG considers rele-
vant to making long-term resource management decisions."242 The
tremendous pool of expertise brought to bear on the Grand Canyon's
resources and the trust that has developed among researchers has en-
abled several significant experiments to be conducted, and river man-
agers have learned from them and adapted their approaches to some
extent.
A few critics have described these experiments as a "wasted oppor-
tunity" because the Glen Canyon AMP does not mandate when infor-
mation gleaned from such experiments must be used to adjust the
management protocols.243 Granted, there is no explicit mandate, and
the experimentation that occurred may not have exhibited the length
and breadth of experimentation that scientists may have wanted. But
nonetheless, experiments have been done that have transformed the
way the system is managed. This is the very heart of adaptive man-
agement and, in turn, resilience.
The primary impediment to making the most of the opportunities
created by experimentation on the Grand Canyon is Congress's un-
willingness to articulate clear ecological priorities among conflicting
societal values. As a result, federal agencies have been extremely re-
luctant to disturb expectations fostered by the Law of the River, to the
benefit of hydropower interests and holders of water rights.244
The AMP articulates the ambitious, and perhaps impossible, goal
not only to "[mlaintain power production capacity and energy genera-
240. Hughes et al., supra note 14, at 590.
241. Id.
242. Camacho, Conjecture, supra note 224, at 955.
243. Id. at 956. Camacho further argued that "[t]he full value of this information for
natural resource management at the Glen Canyon Dam and more generally.., is
substantially hindered by the uncertainty of the regulatory program." Id. at 957.
244. Mary Christina Wood, Reclaiming the Natural Rivers: The Endangered Species
Act as Applied to Endangered River Ecosystems, 40 A~iz. L. REV. 197, 225 (1998)
(describing reluctance to disturb expectations fostered by the Law of the River on
the Colorado and other river basins).
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tion," but also to increase it "where feasible and advisable, within the
framework of the Adaptive Management ecosystem goals."24 5 It also
specifies a hierarchy to be utilized whenever a restoration action
might benefit some resources while adversely affecting others: first,
try actions that help all resources; second, try actions that help some
resources and are neutral to others; and, finally, "as a last resort,"
take actions that benefit some resources while minimizing negative
impacts on others.24 6
Reaching consensus is virtually impossible because of the lack of
clear guidance from Congress, which fosters gridlock due to the
AMWG's almost mutually exclusive objectives of hydropower, irriga-
tion, urban development, preservation of fish species, and other eco-
logical needs.2 47 A National Academy of Sciences-National Research
Council review panel criticized the government's attempt to exploit so
many resource values simultaneously, while providing so few clear
guideposts on which values or resources should be prioritized when
necessary to break an impasse.2 48 According to the National Research
Council, the program's pluralistic approach fails to prioritize manage-
ment objectives and, more fundamentally, fails to reflect a coherent
restoration vision for the system.2 49 Instead of resolving the conflict-
ing mandates of the Law of the River and the ESA, the 1992 Act in-
cludes "a host of confusing and conflicting directives ... that have led
to extensive delays and to this day cause considerable confusion." 250
Professor Adler agrees that restoration efforts have been "ham-
pered by the futile assumption that all uses and values of the Grand
Canyon ecosystem can be maximized simultaneously."2 51 He adds
that, "the programs purport unrealistically to be all things to all re-
sources, that is, to comply fully with environmental restoration goals
while still accommodating all existing water, power, and other
objectives."2 52
The AMWG has been given a lead role in reconciling conflicting
values. 2 53 However, some critics argue that the AMWG "does little to
245. ADLER, TROUBLED SENSE, supra note 1, at 166.
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. COMM. ON GRAND CANYON MONITORING & RESEARCH, NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL,
DOWNSTREAM: ADAPTIVE MANAGEMENT OF GLEN CANYON DAM AND THE COLORADO
RIVER ECOSYSTEM 59, 61-62 (1999).
249. Id. at 63; see ADLER, TROUBLED SENSE, supra note 1, at 166 (stating that the pro-
gram "assumes falsely that all uses and interests can be accommodated equally,
rather than having to make some difficult choices").
250. Camacho, Conjecture, supra note 224, at 947; see also Adler, Lessons, supra note
212, at 85 ("[TIhe new law could be used in an introductory philosophy text as an
example of circular logic.").
251. ADLER, TROUBLED SENSE, supra note 1, at 167.
252. Id. at 243.
253. Camacho, Conjecture, supra note 224, at 944.
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thwart [agency] capture [by hydropower and irrigation interests] or
increase the Secretary's accountability." 25 4 Notably, the AMWG
makes recommendations to the Secretary, which the Secretary is free
to ignore or reject, without explanation,2 55 in effect allowing "both the
AMWG and Secretary to evade responsibility for reconciling the com-
peting use priorities of the Colorado River or other difficult decisions
regarding management of the dam."2 5 6 As a result, one well-heeled
interest group has regularly prevailed in the AMWG process-hydroe-
lectric power. 257 If this trend continues, environmental interests and
other stakeholders will have little incentive to expend their limited
resources on the AMWG process. 2 58
A committee of the AMWG acknowledged that several of the AMP's
goals "are in apparent conflict with one another" and that many stake-
holders "have never committed to defining or achieving specific re-
sources objectives or desired future resource conditions." 259 After a
full decade, "quantifiable targets have not been established for ...
priority resources (humpback chub, sediment, and cultural re-
sources)." 260 As such, the AMP promises both a collaborative and an
adaptive approach to decision-making, but the requirement for collab-
oration without the establishment of clear ecological priorities by Con-
gress has inhibited restoration prospects for the Grand Canyon.
In addition to the lack of clear ecological priorities, the need to
reach consensus with a stakeholder group can also inhibit meaningful
experimentation and adaptation. Critics observe that the AMP tends
to become "bogged down in stakeholder politics." 2 61 No doubt, delays
caused by horse-trading and other types of political maneuvering "pre-
sent serious barriers to learning."262
Most scientists . . . do not design experiments under the watchful eyes of a
large stakeholder committee that must decide how each experiment will affect
their interest before it can proceed. When years of discussion occur between
254. Id. at 951.
255. Id. at 952.
256. Id.
257. See id. at 959 (observing that states and tribes often side with hydro-power inter-
ests out of a concern for the "expedient availability of economical energy."); see
also ADLER, TROUBLED SENSE, supra note 1, at 243 ("In reality, restoration con-
sistently takes second place to development.").
258. Camacho, Conjecture, supra note 224, at 959-60; see id. at 960 n.100 (noting that
an environmental participant of the AMWG recently broke free of the groups'
constraints by suing the Bureau of Reclamation for violating the Endangered
Species Act and National Environmental Policy Act).
259. Id. at 949 (quoting AD Hoc GROUP, MGMT. WORK GROUP, REPORT AND RECOMMEN-
DATIONS TO THE SECRETARY'S DESIGNEE 5 (2007), available at http://www.
usbr.gov/uc/rm/amp/amwg/mtgs/07may22cc/attach_03a.pdf [hereinafter AD Hoc
GROUP REPORT]).
260. Id.
261. ADLER, TROUBLED SENSE, supra note 1, at 167.
262. Id. at 166.
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iterations, and when experiments may not proceed if they affect other uses
such as water and power, the science part of adaptive management bogs
down.... The environmental window within which to conduct the experiment
might open and close before a stakeholder or other process is completed.
2 6 3
Even with these political restraints, the AMP has nonetheless
proved successful at conducting some adaptive management experi-
ments by employing a process designed to alleviate the uncertainties
inherent in managing such complex ecosystems. As such, the AMP
has used experimental water releases to test understanding about
complicated water and sediment dynamics. The releases so far have
taught scientists and managers that their previous model about the
source of sand for sandbar replenishment was incorrect.264 Another
important finding, which has changed management actions, is that in-
sufficient sediments remain in the river to continue to replenish the
beach habitats throughout the canyon. 26 5 Hence, the experimental
flood program has been modified to be triggered only when new sedi-
ments enter the Colorado from the Paria River, and to seek strategies
that would reestablish sediment transport from upstream sources. 26 6
Despite the willingness to engage in some experimentation, endan-
gered fish species have made minimal gains under the Colorado River
Multi-Species Conservation Program. Remnant populations persist
throughout the Canyon, 2 67 but the fate of those populations is con-
tested; some believe that these populations are small but stable, while
others suggest that they are continuing to decline.26s In either case, it
is clear that the native fish populations are susceptible to a number of
factors-water temperature, predation by introduced salmonids, par-
ticularly trout and other game fish,269 and altered habitat. Some level
263. Id. at 166-67. Of course, as anyone who has ever had a proposal reviewed by the
National Science Foundation or by another federal funding agency knows, experi-
ments are indeed sometimes designed under the watchful eyes of external com-
mittees, but the program officers of those agencies have no direct personal or
monetary stake in the outcome.
264. THEODOR S. MELIS ET AL., U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY FACT SHEET 2007-3020: RE-
SEARCH FURTHERS CONSERVATION OF GRAND CANYON SANDBARS (2007), available
at http://pubs.usgs.gov/fs/2007/3020/fs2OO7-3020.pdf.
265. ADLER, TROUBLED SENSE, supra note 1, at 100; Doremus, New Age, supra note
230, at 78; see also Camacho, Conjecture, supra note 224, at 956-57 (conceding
that "these experiments have revealed important information, particularly re-
garding the sediment and nutrient dynamics of the ecosystem downstream from
the Glen Canyon Dam").
266. TIMOTHY J. RANDLE ET AL., COLORADO RIVER ECOSYSTEM SEDIMENT AUGMENTA-
TION APPRAISAL ENGINEERING REPORT (2007), available at http://www.gcmrc.gov/
library/reports/physical/FineSed/Randle2007.pdf.
267. ADLER, TROUBLED SENSE, supra note 1, at 178.
268. Sw. BIOLOGICAL SCI. CTR., U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, THE STATE OF NATURAL
AND CULTURAL RESOURCES IN THE COLORADO RIVER ECOSYSTEM 36-49 (2005),
available at http://www.gcmrc.gov/products/score/2005/pdf/score_2005.pdf [here-
inafter SCORE].
269. Id. at 36-37.
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of consensus can also be reached regarding the resilience of the endan-
gered species-it has shrunk. 270 Consensus can also be reached on
the issue of non-native species, which appear to be increasing in popu-
lations and which pose significant predation and other threats to the
native species. 2 7 1 The ability of the AMP to mobilize, conduct, and
analyze a predator control program is an indication of a successful
adaptive management program.2 72 However, the ultimate efficacy of
species recovery programs in the Grand Canyon remains uncertain.
In summary, consensus-based management can be a serious obsta-
cle for adaptive management and restoration prospects. Requiring
consensus agreement in terms of what recommendations are made to
the Secretary has limited the extent of adaptive management experi-
ments that could have been undertaken. It has created a rather con-
servative set of experimental actions, from water releases to predator
control. But it has not prevented them from occurring, as is the case in
the Everglades.
2. Everglades-Caught in a Quagmire and Unable to Move
While restoration successes in the Grand Canyon remain elusive,
at least there have been a set of experimental management actions
from which learning has occurred. This is in sharp contrast to the
Everglades, where massive amounts of money have not been able to
overcome bureaucratic inertia. Unlike the Glen Canyon AMP, the
Everglades restoration process has been managed and coordinated by
a much less formal structure. Everglades restoration has been guided
by largely parallel efforts by the state and federal governments, with
coordination by the Corps of Engineers. The resulting leadership vac-
uum has led the National Research Council to conclude that, if the
problems of insufficient political leadership continue to plague re-
search and management efforts in the Everglades, "the Restoration
Plan could become an abbreviated series of disconnected projects that
ultimately fail to meet the restoration goals."2 73
The Everglades restoration effort continues to be characterized by
ever more planning rather than any on-the-ground action. The initial
ideas for restoration of the wetlands date back well over two decades.
Yet, after many planning and administrative programs as well as an
270. Lance Gunderson, Resilience, Flexibility and Adaptive Management-Antidotes
for Spurious Certitude?, 3 CONSERVATION ECOLOGY art. 7 (1999), http://www.
consecol.org/vol3/issl/art7/. Current plans are attempting to restore some of that
resilience through the development of supplemental breeding programs.
271. SCORE, supra note 268, at 36.
272. Hughes et al., supra note 14, at 589.
273. Accelerate Pace of Everglades Restoration, MIMI HERALD, Oct. 4, 2008, at 20A
(providing excerpts from Comm. ON INDEP. SCIENTIFIC REVIEW OF EVERGLADES
RESTORATION PROGRESS, supra note 2).
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abundance of resources, the ecosystems continue to founder with little
or no progress. Even though it is mandated by federal legislation, the
social-ecological system has failed to adopt an adaptive management
approach. That is, time after time experiments have been proposed,
but never implemented. This inability to act indicates a pathological
type of resilience or a trap,27 4 and the CERP remains in a political
straight jacket. The reasons for this pathology are unclear, but can be
related to a lack of trust and an unwillingness among the group
charged with implementing CERP to make any real attempts at the
experimentations needed to discover the path to restoration.
Granted, one measure of restoration success can be seen in the re-
moval of anthropogenic phosphorous from the system. However, it
took a federal Clean Water Act lawsuit to stimulate this accomplish-
ment. 275 Even so, while phosphorous levels have dropped signifi-
cantly, they are still too high to prevent the continued degradation of
the Everglades. "Cattails were still spreading like a tumor ... so the
Everglades [were] still dying-just a bit slower than before."2 76 When
compliance deadlines were missed, the parties found themselves back
in federal court. Expressing frustration at Florida's continuing fail-
ures to prevent phosphorous exceedances in and around the Ever-
glades, the court found that the state was in violation of the court-
ordered consent agreement and also remarked that the state's
promises to improve water quality were void of any real commitment:
"Essentially, the [South Florida Water Management] District is stat-
ing 'all is well' and nothing more needs to be done except further meet-
ings and studies."2 77 The following year in a separate suit brought by
the Friends of the Everglades and other environmental groups, the
court found that, "[t]o date, very little progress has been made in con-
structing any of the CERP projects."278 In fact, the judge explicitly
noted that there is "no guarantee" that the federal-state cost-shared
projects "will ever be implemented."2 7 9 Although Florida had author-
ized SFWMD to issue $1.8 million in bonds to "accelerate" eight of the
CERP projects, in large part because of the "slow progress of the
274. Gunderson & Light, supra note 22, at 324.
275. United States v. S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist., 373 F. Supp. 2d 1338, 1347 (S.D. Fla.
2005) (describing CWA action initially lodged by the U.S. in 1988 and a settle-
ment agreement between the parties and the Miccosukee Tribe in 1991); see
supra notes 146-48 and accompanying text (describing CWA citizens' suits).
276. See MICHAEL GRUNWALD, THE SWAMP: THE EVERGLADES, FLORIDA, AND THE POLIT-
ICS OF PARADISE 358 (2006) [hereinafter GRUNWALD, SWAMP].
277. S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist., 373 F. Supp. 2d at 1347.
278. Friends of the Everglades, Inc. v. S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist., No. 02-80309, 2006
WL 3635465, at *28 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 11, 2006).
279. Id. at *28.
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CERP," the court pointed out that there is no legally binding require-
ment that "mandates completion of the Acceler8 projects."28 o
In 2008, in yet another case brought by the Miccosukee Tribe, an-
other federal district court opinion found that the EPA had ignored
the requirements of the Clean Water Act for satisfying water quality
standards when it approved the state's revised schedule for cleaning
up phosphorous-laden water flowing into the Everglades from Lake
Okeechobee. 28 1 At issue were changes to the Everglades restoration
program approved by Florida lawmakers and then-Governor Jeb Bush
in 2003. According to the court, Florida "violated its fundamental
commitment and promise to protect the Everglades" by relaxing rules
limiting the amount of phosphorus in the Everglades ecosystem, and
the EPA, for its part, turned a "blind eye" to the state's lower stan-
dards.282 A goal of ten parts per billion had been set, with a deadline
of 2006. In an effort to satisfy this requirement, the SFWMD began
building special treatment marshes to filter the polluted runoff in
water flowing south. "But in 2003, the sugar industry pushed a bill
through the Legislature that replaced the 2006 deadline with a grad-
ual schedule of benchmarks that don't begin until 2016."283 The court
described the new law as "an adroit legislative effort to obscure the
obvious,"284 in creating "an escape clause that allows non-compli-
ance."28 5 As a result of these delays and others, the cost of the CERP
is now estimated at $10.9 billion, and completion is not anticipated
until the 2030s or 2040.286
The latest chapter in this saga further complicates Everglades res-
toration. In July 2008, it was announced that U.S. Sugar Corporation
would sell its holdings in the Everglades Agricultural Area ("EAA") to
the state of Florida.287 The state has agreed to purchase nearly
188,000 acres of land on the eastern and southern shores of Lake
Okeechobee.288 The decrease in sugar production will likely diminish
phosphorous inputs. Yet if the sugar fields were to be replaced with
280. Id. at *29.
281. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians v. United States, No. 04-21448-CIV, 2008 WL
2967654 (S.D. Fla. July 29, 2008).
282. Id. at *1.
283. Scott Hiaasen & Evan Benn, Judge: Glades Cleanup Ignored, MIAMI HERALD,
July 30, 2008, at 2B.
284. Miccosukee Tribe, 2008 WL 2967654 at *15.
285. Id. at *20.
286. Thomas F. Armistead, Cash and Commitment Rescue Everglades Replumbing:
Proof of Program's Success Remains Decades Away, 8 SOUTHEAST CONSTRUCTION
50 (2008), available at http://southeast.construction.com/features/archive/
0806_Feature4.asp.
287. Peter N. Spotts, Game-changer in the Everglades, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, July
2, 2008, at 13.
288. Id. Florida planned to purchase land, equipment, rail lines, and sugar mills for
around $1.75 billion. Id. However, a shrinking state budget is likely to scale
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urban development or other types of agriculture, an even greater nu-
trient management problem may arise.
Along with the CWA litigation and the recent sugar buy-out, the
ESA continues to play a role in restoration efforts as well, but its ac-
complishments to date have been somewhat less tangible. Popula-
tions of the American crocodile in Florida have improved, 28 9 but other
listed species continue to struggle and new species have been added to
the list.290 The National Research Council recently concluded that,
despite the existence of the South Florida Multi-Species Recovery
Plan, "no scientifically credible plan exists for managing multiple spe-
cies at risk in South Florida."291 It explained that a "stronger concep-
tual basis for multi-species planning and management" is needed, and
recommended that "the Department of the Interior should lead the
development of a South Florida multi-species adaptive management
strategy to accompany the South Florida Multi-Species Recovery
Plan."292
The Multi-Species Plan was intended to be a "living document,
with the flexibility to accommodate changes identified through further
research and to be compatible with adaptive management strate-
gies."293 However, in the Everglades, as in the Grand Canyon and
elsewhere, it is difficult, if not impossible to experiment with endan-
gered taxa.29 4 Ecological resilience is needed for experimentation; it
back the scope of the deal significantly. Damien Cave, Everglades Restoration
Plan Shrinks, NEW YORK TIMES, Apr. 1, 2009, at A18.
289. See Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Reclassifying the American
Crocodile Distinct Population Segment in Florida from Endangered to
Threatened and Initiation of a 5-Year Review, 70 Fed. Reg. 15,052, 15,952 (Mar.
24, 2005) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17) ("[S]ince its listing in 1975, the Amer-
ican crocodile population in Florida has more than doubled, and its distribution
has expanded.").
290. Several species have been listed since the adoption of the Multi-Species Plan,
perhaps most notably the elkhorn and staghorn corals. Endangered and
Threatened Species: Final Listing Determinations for Elkhorn Coral and
Staghorn Coral, 71 Fed. Reg. 26,852 (May 9, 2006) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt.
223). These listings, in particular, "bring[ ] into sharp relief the intertwined rela-
tionship of water quantity and water quality in southern Florida," and, as such,
could have significant impacts on Everglades restoration efforts. Robin Kundis
Craig, Acropora spp.: Water Flow, Water Quality, and Threatened Florida Corals,
22 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 8, 8 (2007).
291. Accelerate Pace of Everglades Restoration, supra note 273; see COMM. ON INDEP.
SCIENTIFIC REVIEW OF EVERGLADES RESTORATION PROGRESS, supra note 2, at 99
("The... Plan... provides practically no guidance on how to manage trade-offs
among species, to set priorities, or to deal with regulatory requirements and
conflicts.").
292. Id.; see supra notes 178-83 (describing the recovery plan).
293. DAWN JENNINGS, MULTI-SPECIEs RECOVERY PLAN USES HOLISTIC, ECOSYSTEM AP-
PROACH 6 (2003), http://sofia.usgs.gov/sfrsf/plw/msrp.html.
294. See J.M. Volkman and W. E. McConnaha, Through a Glass, Darkly: Columbia
River Salmon, The Endangered Species Act, and Adaptive Management, 23
2009]
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provides the buffer against mistakes, so if there is no resilience, then
one cannot adaptively manage populations. 2 95 Perhaps for this rea-
son, the FWS's track record with respect to adaptive implementation
of recovery and habitat conservation plans is not terribly good. FWS
regulations allow both the agencies and the developers "to avoid
meaningful participation and to ignore adaptation."296 Interested
stakeholders (other than the developer) are relegated "to a narrow and
late role," with opportunities for participation arising only after the
FWS and the developer have negotiated the significant substantive
components of the plan. The FWS admits that placing discretion in
the hands of the developer limits stakeholder involvement in the de-
velopment of many HCPs and "inhibit[s] experimental design and
thus the effectiveness of the adaptive-management approach."29 7
Further diminishing the opportunities for adaptive management,
compliance monitoring is typically "deficient, if not entirely absent,
and subsequent adaptation of HCPs to integrate new information or
changed circumstances acquired during implementation is even
rarer."298 The FWS's regulations require HCPs to specify the moni-
toring measures to be used during plan implementation to ensure the
permit's terms and conditions are met,29 9 but "neither the ESA nor
the implementing regulations specify who must conduct the monitor-
ing, leaving considerable discretion to the negotiating parties to shape
an HCP's monitoring program."30 0 Between the lack of adequate im-
plementation funding and the lack of oversight, monitoring programs
have almost invariably fallen short of adaptive management goals.
The most exhaustive empirical study to date on the science of HCPs found
that monitoring plans usually are nonexistent or inadequate as a tool for com-
pliance. Only half of the forty-three HCPs analyzed contained clear descrip-
tions of effects-and-effectiveness monitoring programs. Furthermore, only 5
percent adopted a monitoring strategy sufficient to evaluate the success of the
ENVTL. L. 1249 (1993) (discussing adaptive management and the attempts to aid
salmon recovery).
295. Gunderson, supra note 270.
296. Alejandro E. Camacho, Can Regulation Evolve? Lessons From a Study in Mal-
adaptive Management, 55 UCLA L. REV. 293, 297 (2007) [hereinafter Camacho,
Evolve].
297. Id. at 331 n.233 (citing Notice of Availability of a Final Addendum to the Hand-
book for Habitat Conservation Planning and Incidental Take Permitting Process,
65 Fed. Reg. 35,242, 35,252 (June 1, 2000)).
298. Id. at 298. Likewise, in the implementation stage, "most HCPs rely exclusively
on applicant self-reporting and limited Services oversight," largely because the
decision whether to employ independent peer review during HCP implementa-
tion is left to the developer's discretion. Id. at 316.
299. 50 C.F.R. §§ 17.22(b)(3) (endangered species; permits for scientific purposes, en-
hancement of propagation or survival, or for incidental), 17.32(b)(3) (2008)
(threatened species; permit conditions).
300. Camacho, Evolve, supra note 296, at 325 (emphasis added).
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HCP-that is, the plan's effects on the listed species or overall habitat, or the
effectiveness of mitigation strategies.
3 0 1
Finally, and perhaps most problematic for adaptive management
objectives, the No Surprises rule places the burden on the FWS if un-
foreseen circumstances arise during HCP implementation. 302 Given
the long life of many HCPs3 0 3 and the uncertainties surrounding the
species' response to any given development proposal (much less the
cumulative effects of other development proposals and preexisting de-
velopment) and the species' ability to cope with new threats or chang-
ing circumstances, unforeseen circumstances are almost certain to
arise at some point during the HCP's lifespan.3 04 Yet the No Sur-
prises rule gives the FWS "a strong financial disincentive to engage in
adaptation."30 5 Similarly, the Colorado River Multi-Species Conser-
vation Program offers "more legal certainty to those responsible for
the ongoing harm"-the irrigators and hydroelectric power opera-
tors-"than it does to the protected species." 306 It places all of the risk
of uncertainty on the species or on the federal government, not on the
stakeholders who benefit from status quo operations.307
301. Id. at 326 (citing PETER KAREIVA ET AL., NAT'L CTR. FOR ECOLOGICAL ANALYSIS &
SYNTHESIS WORKING GROUP, USING SCIENCE IN HABITAT CONSERVATION PLANS
28-29 (1999) and describing a study initiated by the American Institute for Bio-
logical Studies).
302. 50 C.F.R. §§ 17.22(b)(5), 17.32(b)(5). For additional details about the No Sur-
prises program, see Fred P. Bosselman, The Statutory and Constitutional Man-
date for a No Surprises Policy, 24 ECOLOGY L.Q. 707, 722-23 (1997).
303. Many HCPs span fifty years. Karin P. Sheldon, Habitat Conservation Planning:
Addressing the Achilles Heel of the Endangered Species Act, 6 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J.
279, 307 (1998). The South Florida Multi-Species Plan has a twenty-year lifes-
pan. U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., supra note 179, at xi. As a recovery plan,
rather than an HCP, the Multi-Species Plan does not itself include an incidental
take permit but instead guides subsequent permit issuance.
304. See COMM. ON RESTORATION OF THE GREATER EVERGLADES ECOSYSTEM, supra note
126, at 7 (describing uncertainties implicated by the Comprehensive Everglades
Plan, including uncertain historical hydrologic conditions, uncertainties related
to the natural variability of ecological systems and model applications, and un-
certain ecosystem responses to climate change and other changing system
processes).
305. Camacho, Evolve, supra note 296, at 332. Unforeseen circumstances are "quite
common in the HCP context given the substantial uncertainty typically present
when an HCP is approved." Id.
306. ADLER, TROUBLED SENSE, supra note 1, at 180.
307. Id. at 182; see Camacho, Evolve, supra note 296, at 332 (stating that the No Sur-
prises rule "places the financial burden on the Services if unforeseen circum-
stances arise during implementation requiring alterations to the HCP. Thus, in
addition to providing applicants the incentive to limit adaptation from the outset,
the HCP program's regulations furnish the Services with a strong financial disin-




As noted above, the success of the South Florida Multi-Species
Plan is closely tied to the successful implementation of the CERP.308
The CERP itself is flawed, however, both because of compromises
made to ensure passage and because of the influence of stakeholder
politics in implementation. In the days leading up to the congres-
sional vote, "[t]here was intense pressure to stay 'on message,' to stop
quibbling over details, to avoid discrediting CERP."309 Even a leading
national environmental group, the Audubon Society, declared that
"'we will continue to seek improvements in the bill to increase restora-
tion benefits-as long as they do not endanger its enactment."' 3 10 The
plan under consideration, however, was the same plan that Ever-
glades National Park scientists had said "'does not represent a resto-
ration scenario for the southern, central and northern Everglades."' 3 1 1
As a result, the final version of CERP failed to guarantee no harm,
much less affirmative improvements, to the Everglades;3 12 rather it
merely ensured that "no one's level of water supply or flood control
would be reduced" and "[niobody's ox would be gored by CERP."313 As
a result, rather than curing south Florida's growth addiction, CERP
feeds it.314
Everglades officials point to the Kissimmee River restoration as a
leading example of federal efforts to coordinate conservation efforts on
multi-jurisdictional lands and waters. 3 15 In 1971, as part of the
C&SF project, a 100-mile meandering river was straightened into a
fifty-mile canal, causing thousands of acres of wetlands to dry up, over
ninety percent of the waterfowl to disappear, native fisheries to crash,
308. See supra notes 182-83 and accompanying text.
309. GRUNWALD, SWAMP, supra note 276, at 341.
310. Id.
311. Id. A staff member of the park's science team told reporters that CERP, as en-
acted, "would do next to nothing for the environment: . . . the emperor has no
clothes." Id. at 343-44 (citing Robert Johnson, as quoted in Michael Grunwald,
In Everglades, a Chance for Redemption, WASH. POST, Sept. 14, 2000, at Al).
312. Id. at 341; see supra note 110, at 1181 (noting concern that restoring flows to
Everglades National Park may compromise ecologically important tree islands in
the Central Everglades and increase turbidity in Central Florida Bay).
313. GRUNWALD, SwAMP, supra note 276, at 343.
314. Id. at 366. "The project aims to supply enough water to help the region double its
population, which will increase the demands on aquifers and wetlands that
prompted the project in the first place." Id. Within the first decade, CERP is
expected to store enough water to support six million more south Florida re-
sidents. Id. at 321.
315. SANDRA POSTEL & BRIAN RICHTER, RwERS FOR LIFE: MANAGING WATER FOR PEO-
PLE AND NATURE 64, 197 (2003) (describing implementation of and potential ben-
efits from adaptive management in Kissimmee River restoration); Michael
Grunwald, An Environmental Reversal of Fortune: The Kissimmee's Revival
Could Provide Lessons for Restoring the Everglades, WASH. POST, June 26, 2002,
at A01 [hereinafter Grunwald, Environmental Reversal] (describing successes of
the Kissimmee project, and its potential as a precedent for the more ambitious
Everglades restoration effort).
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and tons of contaminated runoff to blast its way into Lake
Okeechobee. 3 16 Following a series of scientific studies in the 1970s
through the early 1980s, which documented this environmental degra-
dation, the Corps submitted a plan to restore the river in the mid-
1980s. The plan was rejected by Congress as too expensive. 3 17 The
state of Florida, led by then-Governor Graham, stepped into the
breach and assumed responsibility for Kissimmee restoration. Work-
ing through the South Florida Water Management District, scientists
and engineers approached this restoration using adaptive manage-
ment principles. 3 18 Models were built to help guide questions of what
experiments should be done in the field. After a series of experiments
on how the meandering river might be restored, while still maintain-
ing transportation and flood control objectives, the managers and
scientists demonstrated the feasibility of restoration. In 1999, the
Corps began to backfill a portion of the canal, raze two of its six con-
trol structures, and purchase floodplain properties from willing sell-
ers.3 19 The benefits to the river were "instant and obvious"-wading
birds and sportfish are thriving and water quality has improved sig-
nificantly. 320 The interesting part of this story is that, other than re-
verse engineering, the Corps played little or no part in the adaptive
restoration of the Kissimmee. Instead it was the leadership within
the state-particularly the Governor and the water management dis-
trict-that led to restoration successes.
The Kissimmee project has taken place on a relatively small scale,
but it has already been looked to as precedent for more ambitious res-
toration plans in the United States and elsewhere. 321 Officials from
around the world-Brazil, Japan, Hungary, and England, to name a
few-have taken field trips to the Kissimmee to observe its newly
emerged sandbars, thriving fisheries, and marshes.3 22 Closer to
home, however, some federal officials have questioned whether the
successes on the Kissimmee provide a realistic example for the Ever-
glades restoration. A Corps employee expressed skepticism that the
Everglades plan could possibly replicate the success of the Kissimmee
316. Grunwald, Environmental Reversal, supra note 315, at A01.
317. Light et al., supra note 147, at 141-44.
318. Id.
319. Around the Corps: Kissimmee River Work, 24 ENGINEER UPDATE 15 (September
2000); Grunwald, Environmental Reversal, supra note 315.
320. Grunwald, Environmental Reversal, supra note 315.
321. GRUNWALD, SwAMP, supra note 276, at 358.
322. Id. at 357. Federal and state politicians have predicted that the Everglades
CERP will become the restoration blueprint for the San Francisco Bay, the upper
Mississippi River, and the Great Lakes, as well as the Danube and Nile Rivers,
the Pantanal of Brazil, and the Black, Baltic, and Aral Seas. Id. at 367. Mean-
while, the World Bank points to the CERP as a "paradigm of sustainable develop-




project, noting that the Everglades plan is "a multipurpose water pro-
ject instead of a restoration project, led by engineers instead of scien-
tists, tightening human control of nature instead of removing barriers
and letting nature heal itself."3 23
3. Observations: Avoid Spurious Certitude
One of the key lessons learned from both the Everglades and the
Glen Canyon Dam restoration projects is that "providing ad hoc,
vague directives for experimental, collaborative regulatory processes
invites delay and indecision to the detriment of those resources
harmed by inaction."324 Although collaborative stakeholder groups
can provide guidance to restoration scientists and managers "about
the kinds of issues to study and the kinds of risks that are acceptable
in formulating and conducting adaptive management experiments,"
restoration plans, to be successful, must be unfettered from rigid con-
sensus building requirements and free to experiment "without con-
stant micromanagement." 3 25
Many managers and stakeholders assume that enough is known
about how to restore complex systems, and hence the obstacles to res-
toration can be described as a lack of political will, a failure of agen-
cies to implement statutory requirements for ecological integrity and
species recovery, or shortcomings in the design or composition of the
collaborative processes and groups involved. Yet, the etiology of par-
ticular restoration failures are much more complicated and character-
ized by large amounts of uncertainty. Seeking "spurious certitude"
cannot be the ultimate goal, but it is precisely what most regulated
entities and other stakeholders want.3 26 If scientists cannot predict
outcomes with a great degree of certainty, experimentation will not
take place. As a result, both restoration plans (especially the Ever-
glades plan) seem to be stuck on modeling and data collection, not
resolving uncertainties and learning through active experimenta-
tion.3 27 And restoration continues "to founder on the shoals of special
interests."3 28
323. Id. at 358 (quoting district employee Lou Toth in a 2002 statement to the Wash-
ington Post).
324. Camacho, Conjecture, supra note 224, at 953.
325. ADLER, TROUBLED SENSE, supra note 1, at 168.
326. Gunderson & Light, supra note 22, at 328; see Tarlock, supra note 110, at 1173,
1198 (observing that managers and stakeholders expect adaptive management to
be a "quick fix" to mitigate the most adverse environmental effects rather than to
accomplish sustainable management of ecosystems).
327. Gunderson & Light, supra note 22, at 329.
328. Id. at 332.
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B. Delegating the Task to a Multiple-Use Engineer-
Dominated Agency May Be a Recipe for Failure
Our nation's leaders have long exhibited a tendency to place undue
confidence in the "rational" discipline of engineering to solve our envi-
ronmental problems. 32 9 Engineered solutions reflect the laws of
mathematics and physics, and are evidenced by tangible, concrete out-
comes (both literally and figuratively).3 30 As such, they seem immu-
table to decision-makers and the public. In contrast, under the
scientific method utilized in ecology, biology, and other earth sciences,
a thesis may only stand until subsequent revelations push it aside.3 3 1
Uncertainty is the name of the game. In the hurly-burly of ecosystem
management, this often means that ecologists and biologists, charged
with protecting endangered species and ecological function, get short
shrift.332
Reliance on engineering is deeply embedded in federal water man-
agement because it is deeply embedded in the mindset of the Corps of
Engineers, which was the first federal agency to involve itself in
water-related affairs.3 33 But engineering cannot solve all of our
problems, nor can it be utilized as the sole or even predominant solu-
tion to restoration problems. Indeed, engineering can be counter-
productive. According to the Society for Ecological Restoration
International, an ecosystem is restored "when it contains sufficient bi-
otic and abiotic resources to continue its development without further
assistance or subsidy. It will sustain itself structurally and function-
ally. It will demonstrate resilience to normal ranges of environmental
stress and disturbance. "3 34
Achieving this restoration goal in the Grand Canyon would require
the restoration of natural processes in significant portions of broad,
329. A. Dan Tarlock, A First Look at a Modern Legal Regime for a "Post-Modern"
United States Army Corps of Engineers, 52 U. KAN. L. REV. 1285, 1315-16 (2004)
[hereinafter Tarlock, First Look].
330. Sandra Zelimer, A Tale of Two Imperiled Rivers: Reflections from a Post-Katrina
World, 59 FLA. L. REV. 599, 611 (2007) [hereinafter Zellmer, A Tale] (citing Oliver
Houck, Can We Save New Orleans?, 19 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 55 (2006)).
331. For an in-depth look at the role of science in endangered species protection, see
Doremus, Mandate, supra note 101, at 409-11.
332. Zellmer, A Tale, supra note 330, at 611-12.
333. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, A Brief History: Improving Transportation, http:/!
www.usace.army.mil/History/Pages/Brief/03-transportation/transport.html (last
visited Jan. 13, 2009). Its authorities were expanded by subsequent enactments
and by Executive Order. COMM. TO ASSESS THE U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG'RS
WATER RES. PROJECT PLANNING PROCEDURES, NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, NEW DI-
RECTIONS IN WATER RESOURCES PLANNING FOR THE U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGI-
NEERS 11, 15-16 (1999).
334. SoC'Y FOR ECOLOGICAL RESTORATION INT'L SCI. & POLICY WORKING GROUP, THE




shifting riparian zones, which would, in turn, "require a partial re-
treat from the water's edge."3 3 5 This is precisely the opposite of what
is happening on the ground. On the lower Colorado, for example, the
Corps of Engineers issued over 150 permits for dredging, filling, and
other activities that alter or destroy riparian habitat to facilitate
docks, boat ramps, subdivisions, and the construction or maintenance
of flood control structures in a period of less than three years in the
mid-1990s. 3 36 Meanwhile, according to an investigative report by the
St. Petersburg Times, the Corps "approves more permits to destroy
wetlands in Florida than any other state.... Between 1999 and 2003,
it approved more than 12,000 wetland permits and rejected one."33 7
If the Grand Canyon experience is any indication, agencies within
the Department of Interior are doing a better job of ecosystem restora-
tion. There are at least two plausible reasons for this. For one thing,
there are numerous agencies housed within the Department, ranging
from agencies with biological expertise (the FWS) and broad-based sci-
entific underpinnings (the U.S. Geological Survey) to preservation and
recreation agencies (the National Park Service) to commodity-oriented
agencies (the Bureau of Reclamation and Bureau of Land Manage-
ment). Each of these agencies has a voice in the Secretary's office as
well as with the Department's in-house attorney, the Solicitor of the
Interior. As a result, conflicting positions within the Interior may be
more likely to be aired, discussed, and ironed out before they ossify,
and agencies within the Interior may be more culturally acclimated to
compromise than a military-oriented, engineering agency like the
Corps of Engineers. In addition, each of the resource management
agencies within the Interior has relatively clear parameters placed on
their management discretion. The FWS and the Park Service must
conserve federally listed species and National Park resources, respec-
tively, from jeopardy and impairment, 338 while the Bureau of Land
Management must not only provide for optimum yields of range and
timber resources, but must also give priority to areas of critical envi-
ronmental concern and prevent unnecessary or undue degradation of
the public lands under its jurisdiction. 33 9 The Bureau of Reclamation
335. ADLER, TROUBLED SENSE, supra note 1, at 242. Adler notes that this restoration
goal would require "acceptance that private property rights do not apply to pub-
lic, or 'unownable,' resources within the land-water transition zone." Id.; see
Klein & Zellmer, supra note 73 (calling for a new vision of property at the water's
edge).
336. ADLER, TROUBLED SENSE, supra note 1, at 56 (citing U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV.,
BIOLOGICAL AND CONFERENCE OPINION ON LOWER COLORADO RIVER OPERATIONS
AND MAINTENANCE-LAKE MEAD TO SOUTHERN INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARY 116
(1997)).
337. Craig Pittman & Matthew Waite, They Won't Say No, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES,
May 22, 2005, at 1A.
338. See supra Part II.B.3.
339. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1712, 1732(b) (2000).
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is charged with constructing and delivering water from federal recla-
mation projects, but it too has been charged with several significant
restoration projects as well.340 When agencies disagree, the "buck
stops" at the Secretary's office for resolution.
By comparison, the Corps's discretion to proceed with a project
whenever benefits "to whomsoever they accrue" exceed costs has left
the American public with hundreds of dams, levees, and other struc-
tures justified only by "inflated and methodologically unsound benefit-
cost analysis techniques."34 1 An example can be found in the National
Research Council's indictment of the misguided cost-benefit methodol-
ogy used by the Corps to justify replacing locks and dams on the upper
Mississippi. 34 2 Decisions are often based on "political vote trading in
Congress," rather than principled reasoning and evidence, and "the
'iron triangle'-consisting of the Corps, powerful Congressional com-
mittee chairs, and local project proponents-reduce[s] the executive
branch's role to screening out the least justified projects . . . rather
than budgeting for an optimum set of projects derived via a carefully
developed planning process."3 43 Moreover, judicial intervention has
only rarely curbed the Corps's activities; deference to the agency runs
high, in large part because of the lack of legislative parameters. 34 4
C. Adaptive Management is a Key Ingredient
Adaptive management requires a sustained commitment to experi-
mentation from managers and stakeholders, many of whom would
much prefer finality and certainty. The National Research Council
340. See Reed D. Benson, Dams, Duties, And Discretion: Bureau of Reclamation Water
Project Operations and the Endangered Species Act, 33 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1
(2008) (describing changes in reclamation practices compelled by ESA require-
ments); Bureau of Reclamation, Mission Statement, http://www.usbr.gov/mainl
about/mission.html (last visited Jan. 13, 2009) (describing the agency's mission).
341. Daniel McCool, The River Commons: A New Era in U.S. Water Policy, 83 TEX. L.
REV. 1903, 1906 (2005) [hereinafter McCool, River Commons] (citing COMM. TO
ASSESS THE U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG'RS WATER RES. PROJECT PLANNING PROCE-
DURES, supra note 333, at 67-78); see also Oliver Houck, Unfinished Stories, 73 U.
COLO. L. REV. 867, 939 (2002) ("In-depth and documented reports of... cost-
benefit manipulations, false reporting, employees terminated for honesty, and
humiliating servility to whatever Congress wants funding appear regularly in the
media . . . with little effect."); Tarlock, First Look, supra note 329, at 1315 (criti-
quing the Corps's decision-making).
342. McCool, River Commons, supra note 341, at 1918-19.
343. Tarlock, First Look, supra note 329, at 1304.
344. See, e.g., Marsh v. Or. Natural Res. Council, 490 U.S. 360, 378 (1989) (upholding
the Corp's decision even though the court might have decided otherwise on its
own); In re Operation of Mo. River Sys. Litig., 421 F.3d 618 (8th Cir. 2005) (up-
holding the Corps's operation of dams on the Missouri River); see also Houck,
Unfinished Stories, supra note 341, at 939 ("Immune from the president and in
large part from the courts .... there is no reason, fiscal, environmental, or other-
wise, that appears able to stop them").
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has consistently concluded that adaptive management is an important
component of river restoration and ecosystem management. 34 5 In-
deed, "[aldaptive management is most sorely needed when the re-
source is suffering under the status quo, we do not fully understand
why or what changes will most effectively remedy the situation, and
we are under heavy economic or political pressure to minimize
changes to the status quo,"34 6 such as the Colorado River and Florida
Everglades.
The highly political nature of many regulatory decisions can be a
significant impediment to adaptive measures. Maintaining a commit-
ment to adaptive management techniques may be especially difficult
when deeply entrenched legal rights or interests are concerned.
Water users on western rivers like the Colorado River have expecta-
tions, and in some cases vested property rights, in the use of water
from the river and its tributaries under prior appropriation water
laws. 34 7 Although riparian systems in the eastern states tend to look
less like property rights, water users in Florida received congressional
assurances that their expectations, or "existing legal sources" of
water, would not be depleted by CERP implementation.3 48 In both
cases, decision-makers can be reluctant to experiment and take ad-
vantage of feedback loops for fear of resistance from vested
interests. 3 49
Adaptive management may also be hindered by legal obstacles
posed by the ESA, which requires consultation for all discretionary
federal actions that may adversely affect a listed species or its critical
habitat.3 50 Adaptive management requires sufficient flexibility in ap-
plicable management mandates and sufficient resilience in ecological
resources in order to experiment. Endangered or threatened taxa do
not have such resilience and so it is difficult to conduct experiments in
which the outcome can just as easily cause further endangerment as it
345. WATER SCI. & TECH. BD., NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE MISSOURI RIVER EcosYS-
TEM: EXPLORING THE PROSPECTS FOR RECOVERY 4 (2002).
346. Doremus, New Age, supra note 230, at 71.
347. See Sandra B. Zellmer & Jessica Harder, Unbundling Property in Water, 59 ALA.
L. REV. 679 (2008) (explaining the protection of senior water uses under the west-
ern prior appropriation doctrine and concluding that rights to use water typically
do not exhibit all of the facets of legally protected "takings" property but could be
considered property for due process or other purposes).
348. See supra note 174 and accompanying text.
349. See supra notes 189-98, 208-10 and accompanying text (describing water rights
in Florida and on the Colorado River). Regulatory curtailment of private prop-
erty rights can trigger claims for compensation under the Fifth Amendment. See,
e.g., Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist. v. United States, 49 Fed. Cl. 313
(2001) (siding with water users when the Bureau of Reclamation curtailed con-
tract allowances from a reclamation project in order to provide flow for endan-
gered species).
350. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a) (2006).
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can result in recovery. In this instance, managers should seek to re-
store resilience and decrease vulnerability of species. 3 5 1
In cases where adaptive management has been successful, strong
leadership has emerged. That leadership has supported an adaptive
approach and allowed for successful learning. Leadership is not sin-
gular, and indeed relies on multiple individuals who have helped
guide the system through uncharted scientific, social, and political wa-
ters. In the Kissimmee River, it was the Governor of Florida, the di-
rector of the water management district, and the project manager who
filled these roles.352 More broadly, however, since the passage of the
CERP authorization in 2000, leadership has been absent from the
Everglades, to the extreme detriment of CERP implementation. The
Glen Canyon AMP benefited from the strong leadership of the Secre-
tary of Interior as well as the willingness to take lead roles by other
individual and institutional actors in the system, including the Direc-
tor of the Grand Canyon Monitoring and Research Center, the Direc-
tors of the Bureau of Reclamation and the National Park Service, and
the Superintendent of Grand Canyon National Park. It is this type of
leadership that has allowed adaptive management to proceed, as lim-
ited as it has been. Thus, leadership that supports and allows flexible
and adaptive approaches that actively probe uncertainties of complex
resource issues is a key ingredient of adaptive governance and of res-
toration success.
V. CONCLUSION: A RESTORATION RX353
It will likely take broad-sweeping, generally applicable national
legislation, such as an Ecosystem Restoration Act, to shake loose the
existing maximum sustained yield mindset of natural resources man-
agement and replace it with adaptive, resilience-informed approaches.
We do not see this symposium Article as the appropriate forum for
prescribing any particular set of statutory reform provisions. Based
on the lessons explicated above, however, we do see it as a vehicle for
making the following "big picture" suggestions regarding principles to
be followed: 3 54
(1) Adapt and learn. Adopt adaptive management objectives and
processes that require experimentation, monitoring, and learn-
ing from feedback loops.
351. See supra notes 267-71 and accompanying text.
352. See supra notes 315-20 and accompanying text.
353. Alyson Flournoy deserves the credit for coining this phrase in her article
Restoration Rx: An Evaluation and Prescription, supra note 10, at 188.
354. These points are derived in part from Zellmer, A Tale, supra note 330, at 628-29
(describing features of a proposed Interior Rivers Ecosystem Act that would con-
stitute a comprehensive organic act for the Corps of Engineers).
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(2) Live within our means. Prioritize measures that promote eco-
logical resilience and societal flexibility, rather than measures
that may seem economically desirable for the short-term but
are unsustainable in the long run. Rather than relying on en-
gineered devices to restore degraded ecosystems, strive to re-
store and maintain natural function.
(3) Enhance institutional leadership and adaptive governance.
Provide the Corps and management agencies within the De-
partment of Interior with ecologically based priorities, continu-
ing monitoring responsibilities, and oversight through probing
judicial review, along with a secure funding source for ongoing
monitoring and adaptation. Collaborative stakeholder pro-
grams should be used to make decisions about societal values
and priorities "but not to micromanage program implementa-
tion in ways that render those goals and choices impossible to
attain."3 55
That said, we do not recommend wholesale dismantling of existing
statutes governing endangered species recovery, National Park Sys-
tem management, and pollution control, but we do believe that some
regulatory reform may be required to ensure adaptive implementation
of these statutes to better achieve their explicit goals. By contrast,
extant Flood Control Acts require a complete overhaul to mandate
adaptive management and ecological restoration, and to move the
Corps of Engineers away from the unbounded cost-benefit analysis
currently in place. As described in other articles by one of these au-
thors, a comprehensive organic act to govern the Corps's activities
would be far more beneficial, in terms of ecosystem management and
restoration as described in this Article, than the existing hodgepodge
collection of flood control provisions and Water Resources Develop-
ment Acts.356
Whether existing requirements are supplemented, modified, or re-
scinded, new legislation will require more than just a mandate that
adaptive management be pursued. Stating that adaptive manage-
ment should guide restoration in both the Everglades and Grand Can-
yon legislation has proved to be only marginally successful. Indeed, it
has generated a few successes in the Grand Canyon and virtually
none in the Everglades. Perhaps a beginning would be to have better
legislative guidance on social values and priorities and fewer con-
straints on the scientific processes that underpin adaptive manage-
355. ADLER, TROUBLED SENSE, supra note 1, at 269.
356. See Zellmer, A Tale, supra note 330, at 628-29 (arguing that comprehensive or-
ganic legislation is needed); Klein & Zellmer, supra note 73, at 1535-37 (seeking
a comprehensive reform of federal flood control requirements).
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ment. Legal vehicles should enhance flexibility, learning, and
adaptive approaches, rather than reinforce pathologically resilient in-
stitutions and ecosystems. There is little time to wait.
